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Abstract 
 
Looking at the Current Account balances of the Eurozone, one might draw the conclusion that 
the Eurozone is running a sustainable Current Account balance. The Eurozone is however 
made up of sovereign nations where the economic conditions differ. Some countries in the 
monetary union have been running a persistent large Current Account deficit, while others a 
surplus. According to the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) theory these 
asymmetric values can be brought to balance through Real Exchange Rate realignments. 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the degree of currency misalignment of the euro 
countries. Using the partial model approach in (Salto and Turrini 2010) we firstly identify the 
Real Effective Exchange Rates that are consistent with the Fundamental Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate Theory. Secondly using (Cline 2008) we convert the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rates to Real Bilateral Exchange rates relative to Germany. Using the 
results from (Cline 2008), I assess the asymmetrical Current Account imbalance of the first 
major signatories of the Maastricht treaty.  
 
The results identify that the real exchange rate deviates from the FEER values. The Euro 
currency is especially difficult for the southern half of the continent.  
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1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis (dubbed by some the Great Recession) has led to major divergences 
in the macroeconomic variables amongst Euro countries. With politics following unpleasantly 
close on the path of the Great Depression, the European political scene has seen a rise of 
popular parties that lend their support to nationalistic thoughts and Euroscepticism (Sarotte 
September 29, 2010). Some prominent voices have lent their support for extreme solutions 
like a breakup of the euro currency as being a solution to alleviate the problems facing the 
union(Granville and Kawalec 16.05.2013, Evans-Pritchard 2013).  
 
By looking at the Euro countries separately one realizes that the monetary union is facing 
large asymmetrical shocks. These shocks are manifesting in the Eurozone in different ways. 
One of the asymmetries in the Eurozone are the large Current Account imbalances and how 
they are distributed amongst the euro countries.  
 
“I think everyone would agree that the new mark would soar in value, making German 
manufacturing much less competitive” (Krugman 2013).  Krugman makes the claim that in 
the case of a euro breakup, (or if Germany had its own independent currency) the German 
Mark would appreciate. This can be understood as a possible misalignment of the exchange 
rate of the German Mark. According to Krugman the Euro can be understood as a ”de facto 
foreign exchange intervention to keep the de facto Deutsche mark weak” 
 
According to the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate theory (FEER), large deviation of 
the Current Account can be reduced by having an adjustment in the exchange rate. Based on 
the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate theory, this paper tries to illuminate the question 
whether the real exchange rates between the euro countries are misaligned according to their 
equilibrium values. How have the equilibrium exchange rates changed during the lifespan of 
the euro currency. Based on these values the paper will try and identify the impact of the 
recent financial crisis by the country specific FEER vales. 
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This paper does not focus on the advantages of increased trade between countries or how it 
should improve the mechanism of the currency union.
1
 The paper also limits itself by 
avoiding the possible multiplying effect a common currency might have on trade and trade 
patterns, or even the political role the euro currency has for the European identity.  
 
The structure of this paper is separated in five chapters. The First chapter gives an 
introduction to the FEER methodology and the implications a monetary union has for a 
country’s currency. In the Second chapter I highlight the difference between the nominal 
exchange rate and the real Exchange rate. The Third chapter is used to show the methodology 
as outlined by (Salto and Turrini 2010) to calculate the FEER consistent exchange rate. In the 
Fourth chapter I use the Symmetrical Matrix Inversion Method (SMIM) by Cline (Cline 
2008) to calculate the bilateral exchange rate. The Fifth chapter of the paper is set aside for 
the data used in the calculations. After presenting the data for the specific countries, I 
dedicated the last pages for the results of the calculations. The paper limits itself 
geographically to the earliest major countries to sign and ratify the Maastricht treaty
2
 
  
                                                 
1
 Se Campos, N. F., F. Coricelli and L. Moretti (2014). "Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating the 
Benefits from Membership in the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method." Institute for 
the Study of Labor (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432446). 
2
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
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1.1 The Euro   
The euro currency’s importance in the world cannot be underrated. 18 of the 24 members of 
the European Union are as of 2014 members of the monetary union. The inhabitants of the 
participating countries equal close to 320 million people. Aggregated the Eurozone countries 
make up the second largest economy in GDP only behind USA.  
 
The Eurozone is one of the largest trading partner for USA and China. 3 As well as being a 
large economy it also plays an integral part in the forex markets. The euro currency is the 
second most traded currency after the US dollar. According to (Cohen 2009), the euro 
currency is also the closest alternative to a world reserve currency after the US dollar. 
 
The significance of the euro currency is not limited to the participating countries. For the 
countries choosing not to introduce the euro, the Eurozone as a whole is still usually their 
biggest trading partner, this is also true for Norway. Some of the participating countries also 
have overseas territory, which implies that the euro is also a legal tender in some Caribbean 
islands and the United Kingdom.4 The Euro is also due to historical reasons a legal tenders in 
the European sovereign enclaves.5 The Euro currency is also the preferred currency peg for 
the West African CFA franc and Central African Franc.  It is also the currency the French 
Polynesian islands peg their currency to.  
 
Because of the oddities mentioned above, the value and the stability of the euro currency has 
direct implications for peoples living in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. 
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1212yr.html#2012 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN 
4
 The French Caribbean island of St. Bartheley and Saint Pierre & Miquelon islands. The 
British overseas territories of Akrotiri and Dhekelia are little more than military bases on the 
island of Cypres  
5
 The Vatican City, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco 
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As well as the major economic importance of the common currency it also has an important 
political role. The euro is seen as a major symbol of the common European identity and the 
ideals of the European Union. The Euro is therefore regarded both as an economic goal, but 
also as a means to an end for the political and social integration of Europe.  
 
1.2 The Cline and Williamsons Series 
The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate Theory (FEER) methodology has  its roots in 
the seminal paper by (Williamson 1983), further developed by amongst  (Bayoumi, Clark et 
al. 1994) and (Williamson 1994). In the literature there is not a dominating model amongst 
the FEER methodology. The methodology has changed over time and does not follow a strict 
procedure , see (Akram, Brunvatne et al. 2003). This paper uses the model by (Salto and 
Turrini 2010) in combination with (Cline 2008) to calculate the equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
In a series of bi-annual papers by William Cline and John Williamson at the Peterson 
Institute, calculate the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate values for 34 large economic 
countries (the 35th is an aggregate economic zone to ensure consistency in the model named 
Rest of the World). (Cline 2008, Cline and Williamson 2009, Cline and Williamson 2010a, 
Cline and Williamson 2010b, Cline and Williamson 2010c, Cline and Williamson 2011a, 
Cline and Williamson 2011b, Cline and Williamson 2012a, Cline and Williamson 2012b, 
Cline 2013a, Cline 2013b). For simplicity the set of papers are noted as The Series in this 
paper. 
 
The Series use the model outlined by (Cline 2008) to determine the equilibrium bilateral 
exchange rate relative to the US dollar. Using the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, The 
Series calculates the deviations of Current Account to GDP ratio from its medium term 
equilibrium value based on the projected Current Account to GDP. The FEER methodology 
calculates the exchange rate that is needed to eliminate the deviations of the current account. 
The equilibrium exchange rate in the FEER model is coined the FEER consistent exchange 
rate, or simplified as the FEER value. The model takes center stage in this paper and will be 
detailed later. 
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The choice of countries in The Series, leads them to calculate separate FEER values for hard 
pegged exchange rates, while they treat the Eurozone as a single economy. They therefore 
calculate a one-size-fits-all value for the Eurozone. In later additions to The Series, they do 
calculate the country specific FEERs for a selected few euro countries. I will in this paper 
argue that the Eurozone must be treated as the strictest form of a multilateral fixed exchange 
rate between the participating countries. The model in (Cline 2008) should therefore be 
compatible with countries in a monetary union. The goal of the paper is not to calculate the 
currency specific euro FEER but rather the country specific “intra-Euro” FEER. 
 
Aside from The Series, the (Cline 2008) model has in the past only to my knowledge been 
used in two different papers  (Bårdsgjerde 2011) and (Jeong, Mazier et al. 2010).  In 
(Bårdsgjerde 2011) the author utilizes the model to assess the presence of currency 
intervention in the Chinese currency. The methodology stays true to the original model in 
(Cline 2008). (Jeong, Mazier et al. 2010) use the model to calculate the misalignment of the 
euro country’s exchange rate. While (Jeong, Mazier et al. 2010) have the same aim as this 
paper, their methodology differs to a degree. Going forward it will be natural to compare the 
methodology in this paper with these stated papers. 
1.2.1 The Salto and Turrini adjustment 
In (Salto and Turrini 2010) the authors asses different methods in calculating the exchange 
rate misalignment in the European Union, one of these models are the FEER methodology.  
While The Series calculates the projected misalignments in the exchange rate, (Salto and 
Turrini 2010) calculate the ex-ante values. Due to the different time perspectives, they 
advocate adjusting the ex-ante FEER values. As the Current Account can be affected by many 
variables, the adjustment of the current account tries to eliminate short term fluctuations in the 
Current Account. While this paper stays true to (Cline 2008) for the projected values, I will 
deviate when calculating the ex-post calculations, and adjust the Current Account according 
to (Salto and Turrini 2010) 
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1.3 The OCA 
The economic literature is rich with articles that determine which countries are best suited for 
a common currency. This part of the literature is known as the Optimal Currency Area 
(OCA). The OCA theory tries to apply a cost benefit analysis to determine if countries should 
introduce a common currency. The benefits of joining a monetary union are associated with 
higher price transparency as the nominal exchange rate is fixed. The increased price 
transparency leads to increased trade across countries. The cost of joining a currency area is 
often associated with what is known as asymmetrical shocks and the loss of the nominal 
exchange rate as an automatic stabilizer. The OCA literature can be traced back to the seminal 
paper by (Mundell 1961). Subsequent papers by(McKinnon 1963) and (Kenen 1969) also had 
an important contribution to the literature. 
 
(Mundell 1961) hypothesized a situation where aggregate world demand was to shift from 
one country to another. In the case of two countries, a shift in demand would lead one country 
(Country A) to face high demand while the other country faced lower demand (Country B). 
The demand shifts will lead to high wage and price growth in country A, and lower wage and 
price growth in B. In line with the different levels of unemployment it will also lead to lower 
unemployment in A and higher in country B. 
 
These different price and wage pressures should under flexible exchange rate lead to Country 
A’s currency to nominally appreciate relative to country B. For country A, the changing 
exchange rate makes the imported goods from country B relatively less expensive, while 
making the export to country B more expensive. The changing exchange rate would therefore 
be beneficial to both A and B as it would help alleviate both the unemployment and price 
pressures in both countries.  This automatic stabilizer of a flexible exchange rate is forgone by 
both the countries by employing a fixed exchange rate policy.  
 
This cost of having a fixed exchange rate can, according to Mundell, be offset by a high 
degree of labor mobility and increased price and wage flexibility. Both these would allow the 
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unemployment rate to be more stable. Wage flexibility would imply frequent changes in 
wages, while high labor mobility would allow the labor force to move from country B to 
country A. The cost and benefit are also determined by the bilateral trade relationship and the 
production diversification of the common currency members. (De Grauwe 2009) 
1.3.1 The Trilemma  and the Euro 
In an open economy, a country is faced with something that is known in literature as the 
Impossibility Trinity. As the name indicates the monetary policy has to choose between three 
possible monetary goals. A country can only choose two monetary goals and at the same time 
exclude the third option. The tradeoff between the three different goals not only implies that 
one excludes a goal; the country also limits its policy tools that are consistent with the chosen 
goals. The three possible monetary goals are  
 
1- Full freedom in cross –border capital markets.  
2- Fixed exchange rate (Gold or another pegged currency) 
3- Monetary policy with the objective to stabilize the domestic economy 
 
 
The simple picture on the left shows the 
trilemma, with the three possible monetary 
policy solutions marked with the red dots. 
The first regime is where the capital 
movement is restrained. The monetary policy 
is dedicated to stabilizing the domestic 
economy and having a fixed currency 
regime. On the picture this is the same as the 
dot on the horizontal line. The second regime is indicated with a dot on the upper left side, 
where the country has a floating exchange rate. The monetary policy is set to stabilize the 
economy while having free cross-border capital movements. The third regime is shown as the 
dot on the upper left side, where the country gives up its monetary autonomy. The goals are 
set to having a fixed exchange rate and ensuing free capital movements. (Obstfeld and Taylor 
2003). (Obstfeld, Shambaugh et al. 2005) go through the literature in further details.   
16 
 
 
For the Eurozone the monetary policy can be understood as being twofold, either currency 
specific or country specific. If we fallow the early papers in The Series, we can understand the 
monetary policy for the currency where the monetary policy for the whole of the Eurozone is 
understood as the second regime. The euro is regarded as a floating exchange rate with both 
free movement of capital. The monetary policy in the Eurozone is set by the ECB with an aim 
of stabilizing the inflation “inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term” 
(ECB 2014) 
 
If we consider the monetary policy for the countries individually, the monetary policy can be 
understood as the third regime discussed above. The 18 member countries have a fixed 
exchange rate relative to each other.  As a part of the European Union they are committed to 
allow free movement of capital. This implies that by joining the momentary union, the 
countries forgo the policy goal to have an independent monetary policy that is dedicated to 
stabilize the country’s economy.  
 
The EMS can be considered a pegged exchange rate with some flexibility. The picture below 
shows the different degrees of the exchange rate, with the pure float and the monetary union 
as the two extremes. If a country enters a monetary union it forgoes the nominal exchange 
rate as a possible automatic stabilizer. A monetary union should therefore be regarded as the 
strictest possible form of fixed exchange rate regime. This peg holds for the relative exchange 
rate of the 
participating 
countries and not 
for the monetary 
union’s currency relative to the rest of the world. The implication of participating in a 
monetary union is that the participating countries denominate the wage and prices in a 
common currency. This paper will regard the monetary union as a stricter from of a fixed 
exchange rate. Extrapolating from The Series, we should therefore be able to calculate the 
equilibrium exchange rates for the participating countries and not for the Eurozone as a 
whole.  
17 
 
2 The Nominal and the Real 
A fixed exchange rate is implemented by having a fixed nominal exchange rate. The 
fundamental equilibrium exchange rates methodology calculates the real exchange rate. This 
chapter follow in the footsteps of (Bårdsgjerde 2011) and is dedicated to clarify how these 
two exchange rates are determined, and how they relate to each other. At the end of this 
chapter I will also highlight different versions of the Real exchange rate, as well as some 
characteristic. 
 
2.1 Determining the nominal exchange rate  
The nominal exchange rate can be defined as the relative price of two currencies. Another 
way of understanding the nominal exchange rate is the value of one currency one has to forgo 
to gain another currency. The simplest exchange rate theory is built on the Law of One Price 
(LOP). As with most laws in the economic literature, it should be accepted with a deal of 
skepticism. The LOP says that when measured in the same currency, the same good sold at 
different locations must have the same value.  
 
The LOP states that for any given good i the exchange rate between two currencies should 
reflect the difference in the prices measured as a ratio. The exchange rate is considered 
endogenous. 
2. 1             
   
 
    
  
 
   
  is the price for good i, denoted in German Mark.      
  is the price for the same good i 
denoted in France Franc. In equation 2.1 the LOP          is determined to hold true as the 
exchange rate. If the LOP holds true then the nominal exchange rate is the same as the price 
ratio between the two goods.   
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One can consider the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory, as an extension of the LOP.  
  
2.2              
   
     
 
 
Note now that by dropping the subscript for the i-th good the equation 2.2 does not reflect the 
price for a single good, but rather a basket of goods and services. A basket of these goods and 
services are sold for a given price in both countries. The exchange rate will not show the 
different prices between the goods and services, but rather reflect the relative values of the 
two baskets of goods and services.  
 
Like in the LOP, the nominal exchange rate is endogenous. (Cassel 1918) stated that “As long 
as…free movement of merchandise and…comprehensive trade between the two countries 
takes place, the actual rate of exchange cannot deviate very much from this purchasing power 
parity”. If the LOP holds for every goods in the basket, then the PPP must also hold true.  
 
If        in equation 2.2 is larger the PPP value then the exchange rate is deemed misaligned 
as overvalued This misalignment must lead to a reduction in the value of the nominal 
exchange rate. If the value of the nominal exchange rates falls, it is said to nominally 
depreciate. If        is smaller than the PPP value it is considered undervalued and must 
therefore increase in value. This increase is named a nominal appreciation. 
 
The PPP theory stated above is known as the Absolute PPP. A popular use of the Absolute 
PPP is the Bigmac Index (Economist 2013). An alternative understanding of the PPP theory is 
known as the Relative PPP. The Relative PPP states that the rate between the two countries 
price level may be stated as a proportionate relationship and that “the percentage change in 
exchange rate between two currencies over any period equals the difference between the 
percentage changes in national price levels.” (Krugman 2009) is understood to show the 
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difference in price growth, rather than price level within a time period. Converting equation 
2.2 to growth rates we gain the function for the relative PPP, shown in equation 2.3 bellow.  
 
2.3            ̇      
 
Under the relative PPP,     is the German inflation rate for a basket of goods and services, 
    is the inflation rate for the similar basket of goods and services in France. Deviations 
between the inflation rates will now lead to changes in the exchange rate. This is shown by 
 ̇       , an appreciation is shown as an positive value. Negative values indicate depreciation. 
Inflation is shown using    for Germany and France.  
 
Relative PPP states that the difference in inflation between two countries must lead to a 
change in the exchange rate. This means that, if France has a relative higher rate of inflation 
than Germany, then this must lead to a depreciation of the French Franc vis-à-vis the German 
Mark for the relative PPP to hold true. 
 
There seems to be a consensus amongst economist that the Absolute PPP does not hold 
empirically. The Relative PPP is on the other hand a hotly contested subject. When it comes 
to the Relative PPP we have to distinguish between the short term and the long run. In the 
short run there is again a broad agreement that it does not hold empirically. On the subject of 
the long run convergence of Relative PPP economist disagree on the conclusion. (Balassa 
1964, Rogoff 1996, Taylor 2003). Although the FEER theory assume that the PPP does not 
hold, it does lead us to the building block for our model. 
 
2.2 The real exchange rate 
In the previous section we defined the nominal exchange rate as the “relative price of two 
currencies”. The equation in 2.2 must be regarded as an oversimplification. In the real world 
20 
 
many different factors like transportation cost, trade quotas and taxes make it difficult using 
price comparison to determine the value of goods. The real exchange rate attempts to 
incorporate all these factors. The Real Exchange rates are a measure of overall 
competitiveness of the economy. In equation 2.4 the real exchange rate in is defined as the 
nominal exchange rate, adjusted with the price of goods and services of the countries. 
 
2.4            
          
     
 
 
The          is the nominal exchange rate, while the price ratio is denoted by the two price 
indexes for France and Germany. In a fixed exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate 
is held constant.  
 
If we assume that Absolute PPP holds empirically then changes in the price levels will be 
completely offset by an inverse movement in the exchange rate. Under Absolute PPP, the 
nominal exchange rate ensures that the real exchange rate is held constant over time. If 
relative PPP is validated empirically then slow moving convergence of the nominal exchange 
rate will lead the real exchange rate to fluctuate around a long run trend.  
 
An increase in the real exchange rate is defined as a real depreciation; it happens if the foreign 
price increase or the nominal exchange rate appreciates relative to the home price.
6
 It implies 
that the country (Germany in this example) must sell more to get the same amounts of goods. 
The country is said to become less competitive. If the real exchange rates depresiates the 
denominator country (Germany in this example) gains competitiveness. 
 
                                                 
6
 The denominator increases relative to the numerator 
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If the home prices increase larger than the foreign price or the nominal exchange rate falls, 
then the real exchange rate falls
7
. This is referred to as a real appreciation. The home country 
can gain more of the foreign basket by having to give up less of home consumption. In this 
example the Germany loses competitiveness. 
 
2.2.1 Real exchange rate in a monetary union 
By entering a fixed exchange rate the nominal exchange rate of the participating countries is 
set to a constant value.           . In the case of a monetary union it follows that the 
individual currencies are abandoned and replaced with a common currency. The nominal 
exchange rate is effectively set to 1 (in this case,     . By inserting this value in equation 
2.4, we see that the equation for the real exchange rate on the right hand side collapses to the 
same as the price ratio between two currencies. Imposing    on equation 2.4, the we get  
 
2.5     
     
     
           
   
     
 
 
In the case of a monetary union, any changes in the Real exchange rate must therefore be 
equal to differences in the price levels. Equation 2.5 will be used later in the paper as a 
benchmark to the calculated equilibrium exchange rates. By calculating equation 2.4 to 
growth rates, we get  
 
2.6   ̇                     
Furthermore we can impose a zero growth rate in the nominal exchange rate,         , 
giving us  
 
                                                 
7
 The Numerator grows larger relative to the denominator 
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2.7    ̇              
 
In a monetary union a realignment of the real exchange rate between the participating 
countries can only be done through the relative inflation rates (assuming that the currency 
union is credible and is not expected to fail). This is understood as “Internal devaluation”. It is 
defined in this paper as real exchange rate realignment through price growth in the absence of 
a floating nominal exchange rate. This implies that a real depreciation in equation 2.7 is 
understood as French inflation exceeding German inflation rate. A real appreciation must, on 
the other hand, imply that the German inflation exceeds the French inflation. 
2.2.2 The bilateral and the effective  
In the previous section we defined the relationship between the real exchange rate and the 
nominal exchange rate. In this section we expand our understanding of the Real exchange rate 
and define the relationship between the bilateral exchange rate and the real efficient exchange 
rate.  
 
The definition for the real exchange rate used in the previous section is what is known as the 
bilateral exchange rate. As the name indicates it defines the real exchange rate value between 
two countries. A country usually has multiple trading partners leading to multiple bilateral 
exchange rates. By calculating the weighted average of the bilateral real exchange rates 
(RBER) we get the Real Effective Exchange Rate. The Effective part is added to emphasize 
that the exchange rate has been adjusted by the trade weights.  
 
2.8      ∏  (    )
     
                              
 
In equation 2.3 the variable     is the trade weighted Real Effective Exchange Rate for 
country i. the variable      is a series of bilateral real exchange rate between country i and its 
trading partner, country j. The exponent on the right hand side of 2.8 is the bilateral trade 
weight,     . The equation shows how the real exchange rate is defined as a product of 
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bilateral exchange rate that are raised to the power of     . In (Cline 2008), the sum of all trade 
weights must equal to one to ensure that the REER reflect all the countries the i-th country 
trades with. Mathematically this implies.  
  
2.9   ∑       
 
  
 
The choice of trade weights can have a large impact in the calculation of a country’s Real 
exchange rate and will be detailed in appendix A 
 
Changes in the REER,    can only change in tandem with change in     , the counties 
bilateral real exchange rate vis-à-vis the j-th country. A real effective exchange rate (REER) 
appreciation (depreciation) can only happen because of real bilateral appreciation 
(depreciation). In a monetary regime with floating nominal currency, this can be achieved by 
a nominal appreciation. In a monetary union, like the Eurozone, this has to be achieved by 
price realignments between the participating countries, i.e. internal devaluation.  
 
For three countries     , equation 2.8 can be shown as equation 2.10 
 
2.10           
         
     
 
An interesting observation is that the real effective exchange rate is not determined by a right 
hand variable     
    . The equation 2.10 can be converted to growth rates assuming the trade 
weights are held constant. Using the logarithmic values total differentiating the equation 
(Bårdsgjerde 2011)we can write the changes in the REER as a linear approximation of the 
changes in the RBER as equation 2.13 
 
2.11                                         
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2.12   
     
  
        
       
    
      
       
    
 
 
The dot-accent again indicate percentage change. 
 
2.13     ̇          ̇          ̇  
 
Equation 2.13 shows that percent changes in the countries real effective exchange rate  
  ̇must correspond with a percentage change in any of the bilateral exchange rates     ̇  
              weighted for the relative trade weights     . Due to the trade weights, it 
stands to reason that the bilateral exchange rates bust be more or equally volatile than the 
effective exchange rate. Assume for     ̇  change is at 0,5% while     ̇  is unchanged. If the 
trade weight is 0,5 for both countries, then the total change in the REER is  
                
As the real effective exchange rate in a monetary union is defined as the price levels due to 
the absence of nominal exchange rate, the change in the real bilateral exchange rate are 
understood as differences in the inflation rates between two countries.  
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The triangular relationship and the inverse 
Before we end this chapter we need to highlight two important properties the RBER exhibits. 
These relationships will be used later in the paper for the calculation of the equilibrium 
values. 
 
We assume that the currency market eliminate arbitrage possibilities. The currency market 
must be in a state where the exchange rate has a stable triangular relationship. With three 
countries one of the bilateral exchange rates can be calculated by using the two bilateral 
exchange rates.  
 
Assume that we have the values for two bilateral exchange rate between the German Mark 
and the French Franc,         and the exchange rate between the German Mark and the 
Spanish Peseta,        . We can therefor calculate the exchange rate between Spanish Peseta 
(ESP in the equations) and the French Franc,          as equation 2.14 shows 
 
2.14   
      
       
         
 
The Triangular relationship can also be expanded to show that the bilateral exchange rate 
between two countries must give the following real depreciation rates.  Converting equation 
2.14 to growth rates gives the following relationship 
 
2.15         ̇         ̇         ̇  
 
The bilateral exchange rate is, as the name indicates, a relationship between two countries (or 
currencies). This relationship can be stated in two ways depending on the choice of the 
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denominator. The dual relationship of DM and ₧ can be stated as       , or the inverse 
       can be calculated by taking the inverse of equation 2.14.  
 
2.16          
      
       
 (
       
      
)
  
 (       )
  
 
 
       
 
 
And converting it to growth rates  
 
2.17          ̇          ̇  
 
A real appreciation of        must imply an equivalent real depreciation of       . 
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3 The FEER of the REER 
We now turn our attention to determining the equilibrium value of the real effective Excahnge 
rate (REER). The method chosen in this paper is the FEER methodology as pioneered by John 
Williamson. (Salto and Turrini 2010) calculate how much the REER must change to achieve 
the equilibrium value. In equation 2.13 this is equivalent to the left hand side of the equation. 
As we will see at the end of the chapter, there are many different ways to determine the 
equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
The aim of the Fundamental equilibrium exchange rate models is to determine what the is the 
equilibrium Real Effective Exchange Rate that is consistent with the macroeconomic internal 
and external balance (Williamson 1983) .  
 
The definition of external and internal balance has been updated through the years to keep up 
with the changes in the economic field. With internal balance it is understood as the country’s 
economic activity that is consistent with its supply level. In modern context this translates to 
an inflation rate that is stable in the medium run. For the Eurozone that can be understood as 
being close to 2% or lower. The external balance is defined by the Current Account levels 
achieving a sustainable level in the medium term.  
 
The focus of the (Salto and Turrini 2010) model is only on the external balance and is 
therefore understood as being a partial model. In a partial FEER model the internal balance is 
assumed to converge towards balance in the given time period. Identifying some of the euro 
countries as being in internal balance or converging to an internal balance might seem 
farfetched. In (Cline and Williamson 2008) the authors argue that “If unemployment is being 
deliberately sought in order to reduce inflation to an acceptable target, then one might still 
want to classify a country as being in internal balance.”  
 
According to the Optimal Currency Theory (OCA) discussed in chapter 1.3 the high 
unemployment rate can be understood as a natural result of low labor mobility and/or low 
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price and wage flexibility in a monetary union. I will assume for the sake of argument that the 
high unemployment rate is deemed acceptable for the policymakers as a means to cope with 
asymmetric shocks. 
 
 
A possible downside of using a partial approach is that it ignores possible multiplying effects 
from changes in the REER on to the GDP and the current account. These multiplying effects 
are understood as being small according to (Akram, Brunvatne et al. 2003) 
 
An alternative approach would be to focus on both the internal and the external balance. 
Models that focus on both the internal and external are categorized as general models. The 
model in Jong et al can be stated as being a general model.  
 
The external balance is achieved through the REER having a value that is consistent with the 
equilibrium Current Account level. The relationship can be stated as        . The R is the 
real exchange rate, while the CA is the Current Account level. If there is a deviation of the 
REER from its FEER value, the adjustment that is needed, is dictated by the deviation 
between the actual Current Account and the equilibrium Current Account.       ̅̅ ̅̅      
 ̅ . Deviations between the actual economic level and the equilibrium value can be given as a 
misalignment that is measured in percentage. In The Series the definition of the FEER is 
given as the exchange rate that is “indefinitely sustainable on the basis of existing policies”. 
 
In (Salto and Turrini 2010)  the relationship is stated as taking the form in equation 3.1. All 
the variables are in the same time period. I suppress the country specific and the time 
subscript for simplicity. 
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3.1 
    
 
 
       
 
 
 
The    variable is the REER consistent FEER value and can be understood as the real 
exchange rate in equilibrium in the model. The R is the actual Real Effective Exchange Rate. 
The parameter  , it is the Current Accounts semi-elasticity and is known under the name of 
Current Account Impact Parameter in The Series. The nominator on the right side is made up 
of two variables, the first is the                     . The     variable is the target Current 
Account that is considered in equilibrium. In this paper I will work with two different 
definitions for the    . The     variable is the underlying current account. The     is the 
Current Account level that is given by the cyclical and lagged adjusted Current Account. Both 
the     and     are measured as percentage of GDP. 
 
In the Series the authors only calculate the projected FEER values. As this paper aims to 
calculate the equilibrium values after the fact, I deviate from the from The Series by using the 
Underlying Current Account. While i will be using the cyclical and lagged Current Account 
as stated in (Salto and Turrini 2010), The Series use the projected IMF values.   
 
Equation 3.1 can be simplified to  
 
3.2  ̇  
  ̇
 
 
 
The deviation between the     and     is the Current Account Gap, it can also be understood 
as the external balance gap. The Current Account Gap is the change needed to ensure that the 
country is in external balance. In equation 3.2 the current account gap is defined as   ̇. The 
deviation between the observed REER and the    is measured in percentage  ̇ and is 
equivalent to the left side of equation 2.8. For this calculation we need to understand the 
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relationship between the real exchange rate movements and the Current Account gap. In the 
proceeding sections we show how the variables are calculated in further details. 
 
The first step will be to calculate the    . The second step is to define the equilibrium Current 
Account as the current account that is consistent with the external balance of the economy, 
   .The last step of the model we calculate the Current Account semi-elasticity.  
 
3.1 The Underlying Current Account -     
In The Series, Cline and Williamson use the IMF WEO projections as the underlying balance. 
For projected values of the FEER we will follow this procedure. For the ex post calculations I 
will calculate the cyclical adjusted values of the Current Account. Calculating the ex-post 
underlying Current Account balance follows the method by (Salto and Turrini 2010). The 
adjustment is through two channels, the cyclical and the lagged, as shown in equation 3.3. 
 
3.3                  
 
The first channel is the cyclical changes for the country and its trading partners income in  
variable   . The recent financial crisis has led to fluctuations in the Current Account levels. 
We assume that these fluctuations are short term and not persistent. These fluctuations will 
affect the current account gap from equation 3.2 and therefore give a more volatile 
equilibrium real exchange rate. To be able to separate the short term fluctuation of the Current 
Account Gap, we start by adjusting the Current Account for cyclical fluctuations  on the 
output gap.  
 
The second channel is the lagged changes in the real exchange rate in variable   . The 
argument for adjusting the    for the real exchange rate is based on trade being rigid in the 
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short term due to the auto regressive impact of the REER. There might be different reasons 
for the real exchange rate to lag. Preexisting trade agreements, slow adjusting preferences, 
price rigidity and lagging adjustments by trading partners might explain some of the reasons.  
 
The last variable in equation 3.3 is the actual Current Account to GDP ratio    . The ratio is 
defined by equation 3.4, the GDP is measured in nominal terms.  
 
3.4        
     
           
 
 
Cyclical effects -    
As the Current Account is defined as the same as the trade balance in this paper we adjust for 
the cyclical effects on both the import and export side. If country I’s trading partner is 
experiencing an economic contraction, it will lead to a reduction in how much they import 
from country i (export to country i).The reduction in the trading partners economic activity 
will therefore lead to a reduction in the Current Account level for country i. If the home 
country is in an economic expansion, it will increase its imports, leading to a reduction in the 
Current Account balance.  
 
 
3.5       
          
           
 
         
 
    
     
            
           
 
    
      
  
    
  
 
The degree of economic activity is measured as output gaps, defined as the percentage 
deviation of the nominal      form its trend value     
 
. The subscript   is used to denote 
the trend value, while the subscript   is used to denote for the counties trading partner. The 
cyclical effects are determined by adjusting the output gaps by two factors.  The first factor is 
the export and ratio. The trade ratios are calculated using the import and export values 
(           and  
  
         ) and dividing by the GDP measured in current prices      
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      . In equation 3.5 they are defined as 
          
           
 and 
            
           
 respectively. Both ratios 
are measured in nominal GDP.  
 
The second factor that is used to adjust the output gaps are income elasticity for import and 
export, shown in equation 3.5 as    and     for import and exports. The elasticity values are 
discussed later in this chapter. An increase of either ratio or elasticity will imply a larger 
effect of output gap, and therefore bigger changes on the    . 
 
Lagging effects -    
In (Salto and Turrini 2010), the lagging effect is the product of two factors.  
 
3.6    (
            
           
    
          
           
  ) (                               ) 
 
 
The first parentheses is  the “long term semi-elasticity of trade volumes with respect to the 
REER” (Salto and Turrini 2010). The semi-elasticity is the change in trade due to changes in 
the real exchange rate. Again the trade ratio and elasticity is used and follow the same method 
as outlined above. I will discuss the semi-elasticity in further detail in the next sub chapter.  
 
3.7   (
            
           
    
          
           
  ) 
 
The second parentheses is added based on the calculations by (Bayoumi and Faruqee 1998).  
Salto & Turrini assume that the effect the changes in real exchange rate have on trade lasts for 
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three years. 60% of the lag takes place in the first year, while the following years the value are 
    and    . This auto regressive relationship is shown in equation 3.8 
 
3.8                                               
 
(Salto and Turrini 2010) advocate using the OECD values of the REER and denoting the 
REER in logarithmic value. With the   denoting the different between time period, the 
equation 3.8 reduces to  
3.9                                       
 
Rewriting the first term as                       the equation 3.7 becomes. The  is the 
difference operator between the two time periods 
 
3.10  (                               ) 
 
Salto and Turrini assume that the REER lags only affect the trade volumes while the 
adjustment in the price is assumed to be instantaneous. In this paper it only affects the 
volume. 
 
Combining the equations 3.7 and 3.10 gives us the adjustment induced on the Current 
Account due to the rigidity of the REER, shown as equation 3.6 
3.1.1 The total adjustment and the (Cline 2005) assumptions 
 
Inserting for I and T from equation 3.5 and 3.6 in equation 3.3 gives the    . 
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3.11       
     
           
   
          
           
 
         
 
    
    
            
           
 
    
      
  
    
  
 
 (
            
           
    
          
           
  ) (                               ) 
 
Before going forwards we need to adjust the     to make it compatible with the (Cline 2008). 
(Cline 2005) assumes that the countries import income elastic for both the import and exports 
are at unity.     ,      , along with the import price elasticity     . Compounding 
the equation and suppressing the subscript we end up with the following equation. The small 
letters are used for ratios and logarithmic values of the REER.  
 
3.12                    
           (                               ) 
 
The     values will be more sensitive to the output gap the larger the trade ratios of the 
countries. The     will also be more sensitive the larger the values of the output gap. The 
REER variables in this paper are used on a year-to-year basis. The details for the chosen data 
will be determined later in chapter 5. The calculations for the selected countries are shown in 
appendix B. 
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3.2 Current Account Target -     
Just like the choice of trade weights, the FEER model is also sensitive to the choice of the 
Current Account targets. (Williamson 1994) writes that the Current Account targets have a 
“normative element”, this leads the FEER calculations also to have normative elements.   
 
The Current Account might be accumulating a surplus or a deficit for reasons that might be 
“good” or “bad” (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2011). A surplus might arise as a 
consequence of intern temporal shift in consumption because of an expected positive income 
growth in the country. A deficit might arise due to increased foreign investment in the 
country. The existence of a surplus or deficit in itself can be understood as neither good nor 
bad for a country. Assuming that a Current Account target at 0% percent of GDP qualifies as 
a possible alternative; It is highly unlikely to be a desirable in the medium term. A country 
running a zero Current Account over time forgoes potential intertemporal gains. Because of 
this reason, we will avoid using 0%percent as a possible Current Account target.  
 
To determine the Current Account target I will in this paper use two different methodologies. 
The first method is called “rule of thumb” while the second is the Net Foreign Assets 
approach (NFA). Both targets are used in The Series at different occasions. 
Rule of Thumb 
In The Series Cline and Williamson the “rule of thumb” approach is using a Current Account 
target the value of +/- 3%. In their panel of 35 economies they define the targets in detail 
based on the different conditions for the counties.  
 
The reasoning for the +/- 3% level is based on Cline and Williamson’s interpretation of  
(Reinhart, Rogoff et al. 2003). (Reinhart, Rogoff et al. 2003) identify that emerging 
economies can have an stable external debt to GDP, if it is lower than 40% with zero risk of 
default, internal markets must therefore at least absorb 60% of debt to GDP.  
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With an assumption that emerging countries have a real growth rate of 4-5% yearly and that 
the world inflation is close to 2.5%. The nominal GDP growth rate of 7% can therefore be. If 
the external debt to GDP must be stable at 40% and the assuming nominal GDP is at 7%, then 
the external debt can grow at a given rate and still be assumed to be sustainable.  
 
3.13                 
 
In The Series if the IMF forecast for the counties Current Account to GDP was projected to 
be within the threshold of +/-3% it is considered stable and the country does not have to have 
a Current Account adjustment. If the ratio is within the Current Account target, the country 
does not need to change its REER value. 
 
A similar approach is used by (Bårdsgjerde 2011) and (Bayoumi, Clark et al. 1994). With the 
breakup of the Bretton Woods and the Smithsonian Agreement (Bayoumi, Clark et al. 1994) 
calculate the counterfactual real exchange rate values with a Current Account target of +1%  
in 1970. The Current Account target was chosen as the authors’ claim it was “close to actual 
surplus” and that it was close to the implicit target for the US. In (Bårdsgjerde 2011) the 
stable current account ratios are discussed based on different parameters, and given an 
interval that is deemed sustainable. The intervals vary between +3% and -3%. 
 
While the 3% target is calculated based on emerging economies, the CA/GDP ratio for 
industrialized countries can be stable close to 5% (Freund 2000). If the ratio increases above 
5% the economy starts to show a lower income growth. According to (Freund 2000) the 
Current Account balance reversal falls in line with shifts in the business cycle as  “the Current 
Account is largely a symptom of the business cycle». In (Freund and Warnock 2007) a Current 
Account deficit is correlated with slow growth in income and that for countries with limited 
exchange rate adjustment (monetary union, fixed exchange rate or managed system) will 
“deteriorate more than if the exchange rate were flexible”.  
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In a traditional unilateral fixed exchange rate system the central bank is given the 
responsibility to maintain the exchange rate. If the country faces capital flight the central bank 
must intervene in the supply of currency. The choice of policy tools disposable to the central 
bank can vary. Essentially the central bank must intervene to defend the nominal peg in the 
exchange rate market by selling its foreign reserve and buy the home countries currency. The 
intervention is limited to the value of the central banks foreign exchange reserves. Once the 
foreign exchange reserve is depleted or close to depletion the country is forced to give up the 
currency peg. 
 
In the case of the Eurozone, the National Central Banks (NCB) are allowed to balance their 
balance sheets through TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement 
Express Transfer System) (ECB 2013). In a simplified way the Target2 works as an extension 
of the country’s foreign exchange reserve (Cecchetti, McCauley et al. 2012). This allows the 
country to hold a fixed exchange rate as long as the NCB has a supply of foreign reserves and 
access to loans through the TARGET2 system. For the Current Account this means that the 
country is able to finance a higher Current Account deficit and surplus. 
 
Since it effectively works as an auxiliary foreign reserve allowing, for a larger Current 
Account Deficit (Cecchetti, McCauley et al. 2012), the 3% target must a priori be understood 
as being very strict. In this paper I will regardless assume that the lowest possible sustainable 
limit for Current account GDP ratio should not exceed -3%.  
 
The model assumes that a Current Account deficit below the constraint of -3% must lead the 
countries exchange rate to have a real depreciation. In general we don’t have to define an 
upper limit to the CA/GDP ratio, but we also cannot consider a surplus to be stable over time. 
The reason for that is given by the global balance equation. Assume a world with only two 
countries as in chapter 2, Spain and Germany. If Spain has a lower limit on its debt to GDP 
ratio, it implicitly implies that Germany has an upper limit that equals the lower limit of 
Spain. We therefore use the target from The Series of +/-3%. 
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For this model to give consistent values, the sum of all the Current accounts must sum to zero.  
In our model it is highly unlikely that the selected countries will simultaneously achieve a 
balance that is consistent with the global balance. For the global Current Accounts to be in 
balance, we add an extra country marked as Rest Of the World (RoW).  The RoW country is 
an aggregate country, for all trade done by the selected countries in this paper. The values are 
calculated as residuals from the selected countries. This ensures that the global balance must 
equal to zero.   
 
The REER values for the RoW do not make any analytical sense and will therefore be 
dropped in the analysis. The second advantage of using the RoW country is that the sum of all 
the trade weights equal to one, making it possible to use the (Cline 2008) model (See 
appendix A). 
 
The NFA target 
In (Cline and Williamson 2008) alternative Current Account target is defined by the Net 
Foreign Asset (NFA). In the first articles Cline and Williamson are initially critical of IMF 
and their methodology, but admit that the NFA approach does have redeeming properties in 
that it ensures that the NFA value is consistent with a no-Ponzi condition. In (Cline and 
Williamson 2011b) they use this methodology again as an alternative to the +/-3% target. 
While the 3% follows a “one target fits all”, the NAF targets are calculated individually, using 
the given economic condition of the country.  
 
In the NFA approach, the     is defined as the CA that is consistent with a stable NFA to 
GDP ratio. I use the model as defined by (Bussière, Ca'Zorzi et al. 2010). We start to calculate 
the NFA target with the Balance of Payment identity (BoP). 
 
3.14                        
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In equation 3.14 we find the Current Account again defined as the trade of goods and 
services. Following the Current Account is the capital account   . The Financial account is 
separated for liabilities and assets,    and    .
8
 . The variable   is the balancing item 
account.  
 
An increase in the financial account is defined as capital gains (or loss, if negative).  
 
3.15                
 
The capital holdings can, like the financial account be separated by assets and liabilities  
 
3.16                     
3.17                     
 
A and L are aggregates for all financial holdings, including foreign reserves, private sector 
and public sector holdings, assets owned by foreign holders, FDI and many others  
 
We can first insert equations 3.16 and 3.17 in 3.15  
 
3.18                                    
 
Furthermore equation 3.18 can be solved with respect to     and      
                                                 
8
 A for Assets and L for liabilities 
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3.19                                    
 
The first parenthesis on the left side of 3.19 shows the net foreign assets in time period  , 
while the second parenthesis shows the same in time period    . Equation 3.19 gives us an 
interesting insight, the financial account is defined as the capital gains and the increase in net 
foreign assets. Inserting 3.19 in the BoP identity and assuming that balancing items,   , 
capital transfer,   , and capital gains     , are all zero.  
3.20                            
 
Defining parenthesis as               and solving with respect in the right hand side we 
can rewrite equation 3.20 as 
 
3.21                  
 
Equation 3.21 shows that the Current Account must be regarded as the flow in the time period 
       , while NFA is the stock at a given time. It also tells us how the current account 
balance is financed.  The NFA can be defined as “the difference between the value of foreign 
assets owned by the country’s residents and the value of the country’s assets owned by 
foreigners” (Schmitt-Groh´e & M. Uribe 2014). Before going forwards we assume that this 
equation always holds.  
 
Since I want to define the equilibrium current account as a given value of the NFA we need to 
solve equation 3.21 for the NFA and CA. I start by dividing equation 3.21 by nominal      so 
that the variables are measured as percentage of GDP. The growth rate is defined as      
41 
 
            and price growth as             , the   being the nominal GDP growth 
rate and the   the price growth i.e. inflation.  
 
3.22   
   
       
 
    
       
 
      
       
 
 
The left hand side takes the form of current account to GDP ratio, the left hand side needs 
more explaining. The first step is multiplying the last term with 
           
           
 
3.23   
    
       
 
      
           
 
           
       
 
 
The factor on the last term must be rewritten, by using the growth rates.  
The growth rates can be rewritten as 
 
     
 
      
    
 and 
 
     
 
    
  
 inserting them in 
equation 3.23 gives   
 
3.24                 [
 
          
] 
 
The variables denoted by lower case letters are measured in percentage of GDP. We add and 
subtract with       on the right hand side and solve with respect to            . The 
equation then gives us the following relationship  
 
3.25                  
      
          
       
 
42 
 
To calculate the steady state of the    , the left hand side must equal zero. Allowing us to get 
the steady state value of the Current Account ratio if the     is unchanged, that is when the 
right hand side of the equation is zero. 
 
3.26     
    
      
          
      
  
 
With the       
  being the steady state levels of the NFA, it gives the     consistent Current 
Account target,    
   
. Again the GDP is measured in current prices, the   is the nominal 
growth rate of the economy, while the   is the rate of inflation. To ensure that the NFA 
consistent Current Account target is not affected by short run fluctuations I will take the 
average of time period   and    . Compared to the IMF Methodology (Lee, Ostry et al. 
2008), this model assumes that the capital gains and the valuation effects are zero, otherwise 
it stays true to the original IMF methodology.  
Choosing the Benchmark for      
(Cline and Williamson 2011b) define the steady state level      as “reducing the Current 
Account deficit so that NIIP/GDP will not increase, assuming the deficit was not scheduled to 
fall as in IMF forecast” another way of stating this target is using the previous year’s     , 
unless the projected     is not assumed to fall, in which case they use the projected value. 
The subscript p denotes the projected values from IMF WEO. 
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It is a useful definition if one is calculating ex ante FEER, but difficult for ex post calculations 
for the fact that that the WEO does not have country specific data projections for the 
timeframe in mind for the paper.  
 
IMF (2006) states that the choice of a benchmark might be “to some extent arbitrary, and may 
reflect a variety of considerations”. The original methodology advocated by IMF is to use 
“latest year for which complete data are available”. This methodology is also the one 
advocated in (Salto and Turrini 2010) Following the IMF I will in the ex-ante calculations use 
      to determine the Current Account target    
   
 . For the projected calculations I will 
use the latest     consistent target available. 
 
3.3 Current Account Impact Parameter -    
The third variable in the Salto & Turrini model that needs defining is the Gamma, the 
denominator on the left side of equation 3.1 (p22). This is variable is known in The Series as 
the Current Account impact parameter (CAIP). In the Salto & Turrini model it is known as 
the Current Account semi-elasticity. In this section we use the methodology by (Cenedese and 
Stolper 2012) to show how this calculation for the variable. At the end of this section we 
apply the assumption used in (Cline 2008) to get the CAIP that is used in this paper. As a 
starting point the Current Account is defined again as the trade balance. 
 
3.27              
 
A Current Account surplus arises if exports are larger than the imports.          . If 
imports are larger in then export, the country enters a Current Account deficit       
    . Total export and import are defined by the quantity and price.  
 
3.28        
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3.29       
     
 
The     denotes the total volume of exports equivalently the    is for import. The price for 
export and imports are respectively   
  and   
 . Inserting this in the 3.27 we get the  
 
3.30         
         
     
 
The real exchange rate can be stated as a function of export price and import price. In the 
monetary union the nominal exchange rate is set to 1 and the real exchange rate can therefore 
be reduced to  
3.31  
  
   
  
     
 
We can calculate the differential of equation 3.30 with respect to the real exchange rate  
 
3.32  
    
   
 
    
   
   
  
   
 
   
     
   
   
   
  
   
 
   
    
 
Cenedese and Stolper argue that since the export goods are priced in the local currency then 
changes in the exchange rate do not affect the export prices, therefore  
   
 
   
   must hold. The 
parallel argument for this statement is that the import prices are determined by the changes in 
the exchange rate. Furthermore the import prices are assumed unit elastic with respect to 
changes in the real exchange rate implying  
   
 
   
  
  
      
   
 
   
 
  
 
  
. Using these 
relationships the equation 3.32 we get  
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3.33  
    
   
 
     
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
  
 
  
     
 
We multiply the first term with 
  
    
    
  
 and the second term with 
  
  
  
  
, shifting the factors 
giving. 
 
3.34  
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)  (
       
 
  
)  (
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)  (
     
 
  
 ) 
 
A keen observer will see that the variables inside the first and the third parentheses are the 
same as the import and exports elasticity.    
     
    
  
    
 and    
   
    
  
  
. The numerators in 
the second, fourth and fifth brackets are the same as the value of import and export defined in 
equation 3.28 and 3.29, while the denominator is the real exchange rate. Inserting for the 
elasticities and multiplying with R on both sides gives a similar equation as used in Salto and 
Turrini (2010). 
 
3.35  
   
    
                
 
In (Salto and Turrini 2010) the trade ratios are calculated using a five year backward-looking 
moving averages. This is done to reduce the short term fluctuation affecting the FEER values.  
The elasticity are set to         and           for all the countries.  I will depart from 
their method and again use the method used by Cline (2005).  
 
Using the (Cline 2005) assumption the model coincides with the (Cline 2008) model. He 
assumes that the changes in the price of imports are offset by the change in the volume of 
imports. The reason for this is that import elasticity is set to unity.     . This implies that 
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any changes in the Current Account must happen due to change on the export side of the 
economy. By inserting this assumption in to the equation above, the parenthesis        
sums to zero implying that we drop the import side from the equation.  
 
3.36   
   
    
       
 
This must not be misunderstood as the countries imports are unaffected by the changes in the 
real exchange rate. The model assumes that changes in the volume of trade will cancel out any 
changes in the import prices.  
 
(Cline 2008) assumes that the both the import and export price pass through (ERPT) ratio are 
at unity. (Campa, Goldberg et al. 2005)  conclude that the ERPT ratio for import over four 
months for the first twelve euro countries is close to 0,8. As my calculations have a longer 
time horizon the assumption of an ERPT close to 1 can be safely assumed to be valid.  
 
We can divide equation 3.36 with nominal GDP and solve the equation with respect to the 
Current Account ratio. The current account on the left hand side is now a percentage of GDP 
 
3.37   
   
    
      
 
The left hand side of the equation is similar as equation 3.2 in the beginning of this chapter.  
The right hand side of the equation is the product of two variables; the first being the export 
elasticity whiles the second variable is the export to GDP ratio. According to (Cline 2008) the 
product of the two factors is the same as the Current Account impact parameter.  
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3.38          
 
While Salto and Turrini (2010) assume the elasticities are constant, (Cline 2008) assumes that 
the export elasticity can be assumed to hold the following form.  
 
3.39                    
 
(Cline 2005) builds on the empirical work of (Gagnon 2003, Gagnon 2007). Gagnon shows 
that by excluding the supply side of import and export from an econometric model, one ends 
up with estimates of the demand side that are higher than their true value. To compensate for 
this possible misspecification error (Cline 2005)  assumes that a country with a higher trade 
ratio must have an export supply that is more responsive for changes in the exchange rate. 
This responsiveness on the supply side is assumed to affect the our model through the export 
elasticity   . (Cline 2005) assumes that a country with a low export to GDP ratio will have 
export elasticity at unity. With an increasing trade ratio the export elasticity must fall, for a 
country with 100% export to GDP ratio the elasticity will be close to 0,5. As the ratio grows 
the country is understood to have an export supply that is more sensitive to changes in the real 
exchange rate.   
 
The values of the elasticity are defined by the degree of export ratio in equation 3.39. The 
export ratio between 0 and 1 gives possible export elasticity between -1 and -0,5. 
               ,                   this also holds for     . We therefor assume  
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By inserting for the export elasticity from equation 3.39 in equation 3.38 the semi-elasticity is 
written as the following second degree polynomial.  
 
3.40                           
    
 
It is important to note that the export elasticity is negative leading the semi-elasticity also to 
be negative. This implies that changes in the REER and the Current Account gap have a 
negative relationship. If the country is faced with a positive Current Account gap      
     then the REER must be expected to depreciate to accommodate the external balance, and 
vice versa).  
 
The CAIP will be calculated annually for the individual countries. In the case of projected 
values I will be limited to use the last year of available export data. As the appendix B shows, 
the values are fairly stable over time for the different countries.  
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Alternative models and methodology 
In the economic literature there are many different models for calculating the equilibrium 
exchange rates. Before continuing we take a short side step to summarize the difference 
between the alternative models. 
 
The models shift between determining an equilibrium value of either the nominal or the real 
exchange rate values. I will for the sake of simplicity only use exchange rate in this sub 
chapter. As the different models operate with different time horizon the models must be 
understood as being complementary to each other.  
 
With the different time horizons, come different definitions of equilibrium. For example in 
the short run the Uncovered Interest Parity utilizes the differential between two countries 
interest rates as being the expected change in the exchange rate. The medium term models on 
the other hand use the internal and external balance approach. Along with the FEER 
methodology the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate methodology follows in this group 
(Clark and MacDonald 1998). For the long run exchange rate the PPP is frequently used.  
 
The methodologies also differ from being model based or estimation based. The model based 
methodology assumes that the exchange rate can be calculated given a set of equations, The 
estimation based approach advocates that the exchange rate must be  estimated based on 
econometrics. 
 
(Ellis 2001) (Driver and Westaway 2003) (Cenedese and Stolper 2012) and  (Isard 2007) give 
a thorough discussion on the different methodologies.  
 
As with the alternative methods that are used for the exchange rate, there are also different 
approaches determining the equilibrium Current Account. In this paper I apply two different 
definitions, the +/-3% and the Net Foreign Asset approach. One of the more frequently used 
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method to determine the     is using panel regression. While the NFA approach relies on the 
accounting identity of the Balance of Payment, the Panel regression uses statistical calculation 
to estimate the Current Account norm. Although not used in this paper it has the advantage of 
having a     that is adjusted for the projections of the individual country’s demographics. This 
method is the approach used by among other by (Jeong, Mazier et al. 2010) For further 
discussion see (Bussière, Ca'Zorzi et al. 2010)and (Ca’Zorzi, Chudik et al. 2012) 
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4 The SMIM 
In the previous chapter we used the Underlying Current Account      , the different 
definitions of the Current account targets       and the CAIP to calculate the what we deem 
to be the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange rate (FEER) values. We now turn our attention 
to the (Cline 2008). As stated in Chapter 2.2.2, the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is 
equivalent to the sum of weighted real bilateral exchange rate. Using the FEER values from 
(Salto and Turrini 2010), we now use the Cline model to calculate the Real Bilateral 
Exchange Rate (RBER). Based on the RBER values we will be able to analyze the degree of 
asymmetry in the monetary union.  
 
The Cline (2008) model uses something called the Symmetrical Matrix Inversion Method, or 
SMIM for short. It has in the past been used to calculate the degree of intervention in the 
currency markets (Bårdsgjerde 2011), and by (Jeong, Mazier et al. 2010) currency 
misalignment in the Eurozone. The SMIM has not (to my knowledge) been used with 
methodologies other than the FEER methodology. It stands to reason that the SMIM should 
be compatible with any other models that determine the equilibrium REER value.  
 
Before using the matrix notation of the model we take a step back to describe the model using 
equations. At the end of this chapter the methodology for calculating the SMIM will be 
outlined. This chapter will also conclude the theoretical background needed for the 
calculations in the paper. As the SMIM is simple but tedious to calculate, I will include a step 
by step calculation for the year 1999 in Appendix D. 
 
4.1 The equations   
The model uses the calculated Current Account gap and the semi- elasticity to calculate the 
real bilateral exchange rate that is consistent with the FEER values calculated in chapter 3. 
For the specific country i this can be written as equation 3.2 
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3.2   ̇  
  
 
̇
 
 
We insert the definition for the REER in equation 3.2 in to the equation for the RBER from 
equation 2.5. Equation 4.1 shows this relationship for     
 
4.1   ̇  
   
  
̇          ̇          ̇          ̇   
 
In the SMIM, the REER and the trade weights are the exogenous variable while the RBER is 
the endogenous in the model. The equations equates the percentages changes of the sum of 
the trade weighted RBER to be equal to the percentage changes in the REER. Following 
(Cline 2008) and (Bårdsgjerde 2011) we start by duplicate the equation 4.1 for three 
countries.  
A 
   
  
̇
  ̇          ̇          ̇  
   
  
̇
  ̇          ̇          ̇  
   
  
̇
  ̇          ̇          ̇  
  
For the set of equations to be consistent with the SMIM in (Cline 2008) and (Bårdsgjerde 
2011), We have to denominated the real exchange rate to a numéraire country, in this section 
it is done with country 1 in mind. To be able to do this we first need to multiplying the set A 
with   . 
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Set A 
  ̇           ̇          ̇  
  ̇           ̇          ̇  
  ̇           ̇          ̇  
 
Furthermore we need to change the right hand side of the second and third equations by using 
both the inverse relationship and the triangular relationship as explained in chapter 2 by 
equation 2.17 and 2.15  
 
 
2.15         ̇         ̇         ̇  
2.17          ̇          ̇  
 
We start by taking the inverse from equation 2.17 
 
4.2            ̇          ̇          ̇          ̇   
4.3            ̇          ̇          ̇          ̇  
 
Note that the trade weights are unchanged, but the subscript change along with the values now 
being positive again. We advance by using the equation 2.15 on the last terms of 4.2 and 4.3 
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4.4       ̇      ̇      ̇  
4.5       ̇      ̇      ̇  
 
Equations 4.2 and 4.3 are now  
4.6           ̇      (    ̇      ̇ ) 
4.7          ̇      (    ̇      ̇ ) 
 
We can rearrange the last term and utilize the fact that the sum of all the trade weights equal 
one, and reduce to the following set. 
B 
  ̇           ̇          ̇  
  ̇      ̇          ̇  
  ̇      ̇          ̇  
 
The first equation in B stands out as it has only negative terms on the left hand side. Assume 
an isolated depreciation of the denominator country’s REER (fall in the value of   ̇ ). Due to 
the inverse relationship and the fact that the RBER have negative terms, a deprecation of the 
denominator country ( ̇   must imply a depreciation of the RBER (negative      and     ̇ ). 
The inverse therefore implies that the nominated country must appreciate (positive      and 
    ̇  for  ̇  and  ̇ ). Bårdsgjerde (2011) details the inverse and the triangular relationship in 
greater detail. 
 
The second and third equation also needs some attention. They are set up as all the changes in 
the REER are initially relative to the RBER of the denominator country     ̇ . The counties 
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REER will change relative to the denominator RBER, but the changes will be smaller the 
more important the rest of the trading partners are for the country in question.  For Country 3 
this implies that changes in  ̇  are initially assumed to be one-to-one with     ̇ . The more 
important the other trading partners are (country 2) the less the changes in  ̇  will be, due to 
    . For country 2 it would be equivalent but with respect to      ̇  and     . 
 
By changing the equation we step out of the frying pan and in to the fire. The alteration of the 
set of equations gives us two unknown with three equations, leading to an overdetermination 
problem. To solve this, we again follow Cline (2008) Cline calculates all solutions and takes 
the average of all the possible solutions. (Bårdsgjerde 2011) shows that the overdetermination 
problem has small if any effect on his calculations. (Bårdsgjerde 2011) expands the three 
equation model, and uses it for five country model.  
 
4.2 Matrix notation 
Having determined the equations needed to calculate the SMIM with three countries, we now 
turn or attention to replicating the SMIM for the selected countries. Cline (2008) states that 
the general equation for the denominated country in question takes this form.  
 
4.3    ̇  ∑         ̇
 
                 
 
The left side from set B takes the simple form of a column vector    for the 12 economies (11 
euro and one RoW), giving the dimensions 12x1. The countries are sorted alphabetically with 
RoW on the 12
th
 row. The value for the elements in the   vector are equal to the changes 
needed to close the Current Account gap based on (Salto and Turrini 2010) 
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4.4  
[
 
 
  
   
  
̇
 
 
    
   
̇
]
 
 
 
 [
   ̇
 
    ̇
]
    
   
 
The right hand side of the equation can be written as a product of a matrix and a vector. The 
vector is the set of the unknown RBER, with the dimension 12x1. 
 
4.5  [
    ̇
 
     ̇
]
    
   
 
The second matrix on the right hand side is the set of trade weights. The elements in the 
matrix are determined by equation A.1 from appendix A.  
 
4.6  
[
 
 
 
        
        
      
      
  
          
  
       ]
 
 
 
     
   
 
Noting the fact that the diagonal (i=j) is zero, we have to change it to confine with the set B. 
Following (Cline 2008) we subtract matrix X from an identity matrix  
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4.7  
[
 
 
 
      
      
       
       
  
            
  
  ]
 
 
 
     
     
 
There are two notable differences; the first is that the elements for the trade weight are now 
negative. The second difference is that, a part from the diagonal is that the diagonal elements 
are now equal to one. This gives the following relationship for the matrixes. 
 
4.8       
 
Regarding set B, I stated that the denominator country does not change relative to itself. The 
SMIM therefore eliminates the denominator country in the   vector (we arrange the 
economies alphabetically, making Germany the fifth country). To ensure that 4.2 can be 
multiplied we also eliminate the fifth column in  . The augmentations gives   vector a 1x11 
dimension, while   is now a 11x12 matrix.  
 
Having now altered the dimensions of the matrix, we move towards the calculations of the 
SMIM. As the aim is to determine the values of the Z vector we need to left hand side 
multiply equation 4.8 to have the Z vector isolated on the left side of the equation. This is 
done by first ensuring that    can be inverted. As   is a non-square matrix, we start by 
eliminating one country form the row of  . The inverted   matrix now yields     with the 
dimensions 11x11. Again the need for altercation comes up as   has the dimensions 1x12. It 
is therefore not possible to multiply before removing one country from the row of vector  . 
We remove the same country from   as we did for  . 
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The row removal from equation 4.8 is repeated for every single country one at a time, giving 
us i numbers of calculation. (Cline 2008) highlights alternative methods of averaging the 
calculations and concludes that a simple average is the method that yields the best result.  
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5 The Results 
With the theoretical framework at hand, we now turn our attention to the data and the results 
from the calculations. The beginning of this chapter is dedicated to clarifying the variables 
and the intermediate calculations needed for the SMIM calculations. In the following section I 
will present the general trend in the calculation before going on to the specific countries.  
 
5.1 Data 
The calculation uses different sources for the data, all shown in the table below. All the 
variables are measured annually, with OECD REER calculated by the average of monthly 
figures and indexed in year 2005. The choice of index year does not have a profound impact 
on the calculations as we use the logarithmic values before calculating the REER lag in 
equation 3,7. The GDP, Total Export and Total Import are all measured in current prices. The 
Net Foreign Assets are collected from Eurostat, and like the Current Account are also 
measured in percentage of GDP. 
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Table 1: Dataset 
Variable  Database 
Nominal GDP  IMF WEO October  2013  
Current Account level IMF WEO October  2013 
Total Export of Goods & Services DG ECFIN AMECO 
Total Imports of Goods & Services DG ECFIN AMECO 
Countries Specific Output Gap OECD Economic Outlook 2013/2 
World Output Gap OECD Economic Outlook 2013/2 
Real Effective Exchange Rates CPI Based, Index=2010 OECD MEI 
Net International Investment Position Eurostat 
GDP growth  IMF WEO October  2013 
HICP, All-Items HICP Y/Y Change Eurostat/ECB 
 
The Output gaps are taken from OECD Economic Outlook 2013/2 database. The World 
output gap is calculated by the OECD , they first calculate the real GDP growth by “moving 
nominal GDP weights, using purchasing power parities” (OECD 2013), followed by applying 
the HP-filter on the aggregated data.  
 
The Current Account data is separated between the ex post and the ex-ante values as stated in 
the paper. The IMF WEO October 2013 calculates the country specific Current Account up to 
the year 2012 while the variables between 2013 and 2018 are the projected values. Because of 
this limitation the ex-post variables will be calculated between 1999 and 2012.  
 
The country specific NFA data in the given timeframe is available for the selected countries, 
except for Belgium. The reason for the lack of data is due to the fact that Belgium was in an 
economic union with Luxembourg (The union included monetary union amongst other 
economic policies). The Belgium NFA data is aggregated with the Luxemburg data. It is not 
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an obstacle for the 3% target. Since the model rests on the assumption that the trade weights 
are equal to one, we are limited to calculate the NFA target using data from 2002. 
Furthermore the NFA target for time period t is calculated using data form the previous time 
period t-1, the first possible NFA target we can calculate is for 2003. The NFA target will 
therefore be calculated from 2003 up to 2012. The projected values of the NFA in the time 
periodes 2013-2018 are based on the NFA from 2012. 
5.2 Trade weight 
The trade weights are calculated using the bilateral trade flows from Eurostat COMEXT 
database. The database has some minor inconsistencies. It states different values for the 
bilateral trade flows based on the country reporting the data.  In a perfect world the import to 
country A from country B should be consistent with export from country B to country A. This 
inconsistency is a recurring problem in international trade statistics. (This is also true for the 
data in IMFs Direction of Trade Statistics database) 
 
One possible explanation given for this is the different currency used to value the trade in. 
This should not be an issue for the selected countries, as they use the same currency. Other 
possible explanation for the inconsistent data may be different accounting practices. Assume a 
good is traded across a sea route. A country might register a good exported when it leaves the 
port but may not be registered as imported before it enters the destination countries territorial 
waters. The time spent in transit, the goods are considered to be in a state of limbo. It is also 
possible that some goods go to waste due to ineffective transport methods or dishonesty.  
 
The Series does not advocate any solution to this obstacle. (Bårdsgjerde 2011) chooses to use 
only export data for the calculation of the trade weights. In this paper I try and overcome this 
inconsistency in data by calculating the average of the reported export and import before 
using these averages to calculate the trade weights. Se Appendix A for the calculations.  
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5.3 The FEER values  
In appendix C, the tables show three different values for the countries Real Bilateral 
Exchange Rate with Germany as the denominator. The two FEER values are marked as R(3) 
and R(NFA) for the +/-3% and NFA values respectively. To assess the degree of constraint I 
compare the FEER values with the REBR, using equation 2.1 as a benchmark value. The 
benchmark RBER is named R* in the tables. The price index used to calculate R*is the HICP. 
The HCPI is the year to year change at the end of fourth quarter. Being limited by the NFA 
data, I index the R* to 100 in year 2003. The R* value of 2012 will be extended up to 2018 
for the sake of comparison. 
 
The FEER results should be understood as synthetic counterfactual, the RBER values that 
would and should prevail if the Current Account Gap were eliminated (equivalent to 
achieving external balance). A FEER value larger than the prevailing RBER (R*) must be 
understood as overvalued, to achieve equilibrium the real exchange rate must appreciation. 
Symmetrically the case of a FEER values smaller than R* must be understood as the real 
exchange rate is undervalued. A real depreciation is needed to close the Current Account Gap. 
The data is reported in Appendix C 
 
I want to analyses the misalignment in three different distinct time periods, The early years, 
The Great Recession and Post Great Recession. The Great Recession impacted the countries 
at differently times. In this paper I define the time period between 2008 and 2012 as The 
Great Recession. The early years are from 1999 to 2007. The Post Great Recession is defined 
as 2013 to 2018. 
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Austria 
During the early 
part of the Euro 
currency the 
FEER targets and 
the actual RBER 
stay very close to 
each other until 
2003. From then 
on we see a 
detachment with 
a minor 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate. During the Great recession we see a distinct deviation 
between the three values. The highest in the FEER values is the R(NFA) in 2008 with a FEER 
value equal to 1,20 while R* is 1,00. R(3) indicates that the economy needs an appreciation, 
the lowest value is in 2012 at 0,86 when R* is 1,03. In the Post Great Recession we see a 
convergence of the FEER values to projected real appreciation. The lowest FEER value is the 
R(3) in 2012 with the RBER overvalued with 19%.  
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Belgium 
For Belgium we 
again see that the 
FEER consistent 
RBERs follow 
each other 
closely. From 
1999 to 2003, 
R(3) is larger 
than R* 
indicating a need 
for an 
appreciation. This relationship switches from 2003 onwards, both for the ex-post and the ex-
ante calculation. The Great Recession does have a minor impact in that it reduces the 
deviation between the FEERs and R*. The highest FEER value is the R(3) in 1999 with an 
undervaluation of 9%. The lowest FEER value is in 2012, with an overvaluation of 23% 
 
Finland 
  
In the early years 
of the Monetary 
Union indicated a 
need for 
appreciation with 
an the exchange 
rate undervalued 
by 33%. Like 
Belgium the 
pressure subsides 
and shifts. The 
degree of deviation between the FEER values and R* is larger than for Belgium, indicating a 
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larger degree of undervaluation. The shift from appreciation to depreciation coincides with R* 
having a bilateral depreciation relative to Germany. In 2008 the R(nfa), like Austrias R(nfa) 
has a spike in the FEER values. The projected values show a large degree of uncertainty in the 
FEER values. While the R(3) FEER expects close to 20 % depreciation while R(nfa) expects 
close to 40%  depreciation relative to today’s R*.  
France 
 
In the initial 
years of the 
union, France 
has a R(3) value 
that exactly 
follows R*. 
Again the 3% 
target is more 
conservative 
than the NFA 
target. In the 
time period 2004-2012 the FEER values expect depreciation, after the Great Recession the 
deviation between the FEERs and R* stabilizes around 18% depreciation for R(NFA) and  7% 
for the R83). Again we can see the trend of reduced deviation between the FEER consistent 
RBERs and R* in the projected values, while the RBER is overvalued during the Great 
Recession.  
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Greece 
Greece is the 
country that has 
the largest 
deviation between 
both the FEER 
values and R*.  
The deviation 
between Greece’s 
FEERs and R* 
are equal to an 
overvaluation of 
up to 20% during the Great Recession. Between 2006 and 2012 the FEER targets dips further 
down. The overvaluation is 90% according to R(nfa) and 70% according to R(3). In the Post 
Great Recession time period the overvaluation is reduced, helped by the internal devaluation 
in 2010, 2011 and 2013. While the R (3) appreciates, R (nfa) holds the same value probably 
due to the use of 2012 NFA numbers. 
Ireland 
 
Ireland, like 
Belgium and 
Finland, starts 
with a R(3) value 
that is higher 
than R*. After 
2004 this 
relationship again 
follows the 
similar pattern of 
a lower persistent 
FEER values in relationship with R*. Relative to the other countries Irelands FEER values 
shows high degree of consistency, especially after 2011. The largest overvaluation is 
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according to R(nfa) high as 34% in 2010 and a undervaluation as low as 9% in 2000. An 
interesting aspect of the Ireland data is that it has been able to reduce the deviation from the 
FEERs and R* by having an internal devaluation (the same can be observed in the Greece 
calculations, but to a lesser extent). This reflects deflation in 2009 and 2010). During the 
Great Recession the R(nfa) dips temporarily in year 2009 and 2010 (from 0,83 to 0,71), while 
R(3) displays less volatile values. 
 
Italy 
 
Italy mimics 
France’s RBER 
in the initial 
years and before 
following the rest 
of the countries 
with an 
overvaluation, 
similarly to 
Austria and 
Belgium. Compared with the R(nfa) target we get some conflicting pictures of Italy. An 
interesting aspect is that the FEERs diverge in 2009 and 2010, almost mirroring each other. 
R(nfa) advocates a lower RBER value than R(3), with the lowest point at 0,77 in 2010, equal 
to an overvaluation of 32%. The overvaluation for R(3) at the same time is 7% and 13% for 
2009 and 2010. The projected values for the FEERs show lower degree of deviation between 
the FEERs and R*.   
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Netherlands 
Of the selected 
countries, 
Netherlands is 
the one that 
clearly stands 
out. It is the only 
country that 
persistently an 
undervalued real 
bilateral 
exchange rate. 
The highest overvaluation is 3% and 1,5% for R(3) and R(NFA), they both follows R* fairly 
closely. The largest deviation in the Ex-post calculation is found in 2011 when the R* is 
0,07% lower than the R(nfa). During the Great Recession the FEERs exhibit dips, but 
compared to the other countries must be understood as being insignificant in size. Both the 
projected FEERs imply that Netherlands should have a depreciation, relative to Germany 
Netherlands is undoubtedly the country that is least constrained by the Union. 
Portugal  
Of all the 
countries, 
Portugal is the 
country with the 
least volatile 
FEER values. On 
the other hand it 
is also the country 
(with Greece and 
Spain) that needs 
the largest real 
exchange rate misalignment. Like Greece it has a lower FEER value than R* when entering 
the union, 24% overvalued. The lowest deviation between the FEERs and R* is in 2002 and 
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2003 (18% and 15% overvalued R(3)).  Surprisingly, the Great Recession seems not to lead to 
a major shift on R(3) and a minimal effect on R(nfa). We do on the other hand observe a 
small dip in R* in 2009, but this must again be considered minute changes, as it goes from 
1,0108 in 2008 to 1,0018 in 2009 and back to 1,006 and 1,015 in 2010 and 2011. The largest 
overvaluation is according to R(nfa) in 2009 at 70%. For R(3) it is 53% in 2007.  
Spain 
Spain has a R(3) 
close to R* in the 
initial years, but 
start to 
experience a 
detachment in 
2003. In the first 
time period the 
undervaluation is 
at most 7%. 
Following R(nfa) 
we get a different 
picture, with 40% overvaluation. While the R(3) has in average between 1999 and 2012 an 
overvaluation of 5%.  Like Italy, Spain has FEER values that move in opposite directions 
during the Great Recession, the R(3) jumps from 1% to 17% from 2003 to 2012., The R(nfa)  
overvaluation is rapidly decreasing in the same time.   
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5.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of the paper is to asses if exchange rates have misaligned, and how these 
misalignments have changed in the early years of the common currency. The value are 
calculated from 1999 to 2018 and separated in three periods. The Early years from 1999 to 
2007, the Great Recession between 2008 and 2012, and post Great Recession from 2013 to 
2018.  
 
The models applied in this paper are the partial Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
model of (Salto and Turrini 2010), used simultaneously with Cline 2008. In this paper we 
used two different definitions for the equilibrium Current Account, and calculated the 
exchange rate with Germany as numeraire. The first target is the 3% target; the second is the 
Net Foreign Asset target. The values are compared with the actual real exchange rate between 
the countries using the ECB Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.  Since we are calculating 
the bilateral exchange rate, if an exchange rate is deemed overvalued it also implies that 
Germany at the same time is overvalued. This mirrored relationship also holds for a country 
that is undervalued, Germany will be overvalued.   
 
The two targets give different degree of overvaluation or undervaluation, but are general trend 
is the 3% target giving lower degree of undervaluation and overvaluation.  The average 
difference between the two targets is 9%, 6%, and 10% for the stated time periods. It should 
be noted that the difference in values for the early years (between 2003 and 2007) is affected 
because of the lack of data for the NFA prior to 2002.  
In Table 2 below, the average values of the misalignments of the targets are shown using the 
row four and five for the given country from appendix C. The values are relative to Germany, 
separated in the three time periods. It is calculated using the values in appendix C under the 
column SMIM. The names are shortened, and presented alphabetically
9
. The values in the cell 
                                                 
9
 Austria (Aus), Belgium (Bel), Finland (Fin), France(Fra), Greece (gre), Ireland (Ire), Italy (Ita), Netherlands 
(Neth), Portugal (Por) and Spain (Spa) 
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are in percentages. Positive values shoe undervaluation, while negative values show 
overvaluation. 
Table 2 Average Bilateral misalignment 
Average values of both 
targets (in percentage) 
Aus Bel Fin Fra Gre Ire Ita Neth Por Spa 
The Early Years  
(1999-2007) 
3,29  5,87  5,87 7,82 37,95 6,98 8,82  -1,78  47,29  16,15  
Great Recessen  
(2008-2012) 
5,36  12,93  12,93  15,39 65,71 21,44 18,52  -0,92  51,04  21,41  
Post Great Recessen 
(2013-2018) 
12,31  13,68  13,68  11,97 54,55 14,78 11,62  -5,32  37,03  7,04  
 
During the early years the exchange rates are misaligned to a low degree. According to the 
3%-targets, the countries are 9% undervalued relative to Germany, while according to the Net 
Foreign Asset (NFA) targets is 19%. Finland and Ireland to a lesser degree (also Belgium in 
1999) are according to the model undervalued. Austria, France, Italy, Netherland, Spain and 
Belgium (for 2000-2007), must be regarded in equilibrium as the model assesses minute 
changes need for real exchange rate. Prior to the Great Recession, we identify larger 
misalignment with the southern countries, Greece and Portugal. Greece has at most a real 
exchange rate overvaluation of R(3) in 2007 at 67% overvaluation. For Portugal this R(NFA) 
value in 2007 is 53% overvaluation  
 
During the Great Recession the number of countries categorized as overvalued increase, along 
with the degree of misalignment, with Greece increasing from on average overvaluation 
before the Great Recession is 37% while during the Great Recession it is 65%. For Portugal 
the average values are 47% and 51%. The targets for Ireland show an increasing degree of 
overvaluation. Both Ireland and Greece are able to reduce the overvaluation through deflation 
in the counties price level column . For Austria, Belgium, France Finland, Italy and 
Netherlands the values show relative low degree of misalignment.  Spain is a special case as 
the two targets tell two different stories; the 3% target says the real exchange rate is slightly 
overvalued around 10%, while the NFA target says 30% a value close to Portugal in the 
previous time period. The Current Account vales in this time period shows increased 
fluctuation with the southern countries running an increase Current Account Deficit, and the 
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Northern countries like Germany, Netherlands and Austria are running a current account 
surplus.  
In the projected Post Great Resection values the equilibrium values are compared to the actual 
real exchange rate in 2012, the last year with complete data. Greece, Italy, Ireland and 
Portugal are identified as in still in the need of a real realignment. For Spain the values differ 
based on which targets are chosen. The 3% target gives a projected undervaluation of 12% 
and falling in the time period. The NFA target predicts an overvaluation of 5% by 2017.For 
the rest of the countries the projected undervaluation are projected to last around the Great 
Recession levels, with some reduction. The reasons might be due to the use of values from 
2012. Some note should be taken for the values of Netherlands as it is the only country to 
have a real exchange rate that is persistently undervalued in all three time periods.  
Greece and Portugal are identified as the countries, with the need for greatest realignment 
even prior to the start of the Euro. During the Great Recession the need for realignment is 
increased dramatically with the overvaluation calculated at 90% and 70% at most. 
Netherlands and Austria are the countries in this paper the least need for realignment.  
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Appendix A – Trade Weights 
The Trade weights in the model are calculated according to Cline (2008).  
 
A.1        
         
      
     
 
The denominator is the sum of country i’s export and import. The nominator is the sum of two 
bilateral trade flows. The subscripts denote the participating country and the directions of the 
trade flow, with the first subscript denoting the sender while the second subscript denotes the 
recipient.  The first variable therefore becomes country i’s import from j (equivalent to export 
from j to i), and the second variable the country i’s export to country j (equivalent to import to 
j form i). In the case of i=j the nominator must obviously be zero ensuring that the elements in 
the diagonal of the trade weight matrix must be       .  
 
We start by first calculating the arithmetic averages of the import and export data (see Chapter 
5). For the second step we need to calculate the countries bilateral trade flow with the RoW. 
This is done by calculating the RoW as the residuals of the euro countries export and import 
from their total trade flow. For export trade flow we subtract the sum of bilateral trade flow 
for country j from the other Euro countries, from the sum of the total export for country j 
 
A.2             ∑     
  
                  
 
For import trade flow we subtract the sum of bilateral trade flow for country j from the other 
Euro countries, from the sum of the total import for country j 
 
A.3            ∑     
  
                 
 
The total export and import for Row is calculated as the sum of the bilateral trade flows  
 
A.4       ∑      
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A.5      ∑       
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7.2 Appendix B – Underlying Current Account, 
Targets & CAIP 
 
Applying the (Salto and Turrini 2010) adjustment on the Current Account we get the 
following values as the    . In the table under the Current Account is only adjusted for the 
ex-post calculations while the ex-ante are the same as the IMF WEO October 2013 
projections. The Ex-ante Current Account Semi-Elasticizes are held constant after 2012. 
 
In the tables below shows the REER targets calculated for the individual countries. All values 
are shown in percentage. The first column (from the left) shows the     from 1999 to 2012, 
from 2013 and onwards the columns show the IMF projections. The second and third columns 
show the Current Account targets based on the two Current Account targets chosen in this 
paper. The firth and fifth shows the corresponding Current Account gaps based on the 
difference between the     and the two different targets. The sixth column is the yearly 
updated Current Account semi-elasticity, it is calculated using equation 3.24. the export ratio 
is calculated the same way as in equation 3.10. The last two columns show the changes in the 
REER needed to achieve the FEER targets. They are calculated by dividing column four and 
five with the corresponding CAIP for the given year. It is also equivalent to the left side 
vector in the SMIM (se equation 4.3).  
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Austria 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 2,383 2,383 -2,421 0,000 4,804 -0,421 0,000 -11,417 
2017 2,337 2,337 -2,375 0,000 4,712 -0,421 0,000 -11,198 
2016 2,345 2,345 -2,383 0,000 4,728 -0,421 0,000 -11,236 
2015 2,364 2,364 -2,402 0,000 4,766 -0,421 0,000 -11,326 
2014 2,436 2,436 -2,474 0,000 4,910 -0,421 0,000 -11,669 
2013 2,802 2,802 -2,840 0,000 5,642 -0,421 0,000 -13,408 
2012 1,506 1,506 -1,544 0,000 3,051 -0,421 0,000 -7,250 
2011 1,272 1,272 -1,573 0,000 2,844 -0,421 0,000 -6,752 
2010 2,931 2,931 -2,980 0,000 5,911 -0,409 0,000 -14,464 
2009 2,915 2,915 -2,933 0,000 5,848 -0,388 0,000 -15,062 
2008 5,237 3,000 -6,115 2,237 11,352 -0,429 -5,213 -26,453 
2007 3,672 3,000 -4,874 0,672 8,546 -0,428 -1,570 -19,981 
2006 2,862 2,862 -3,823 0,000 6,685 -0,417 0,000 -16,021 
2005 2,031 2,031 -2,783 0,000 4,814 -0,406 0,000 -11,850 
2004 2,099 2,099 -2,599 0,000 4,698 -0,395 0,000 -11,886 
2003 2,004 2,004 -2,548 0,000 4,552 -0,379 0,000 -12,008 
2002 3,481 3,000   0,481   -0,381 -1,262   
2001 -0,048 -0,048   0,000   -0,378 0,000   
2000 0,059 0,059   0,000   -0,368 0,000   
1999 -1,081 -1,081   0,000   -0,345 0,000   
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Belgium 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 0,847 0,847 1,595 0,000 -0,748 -0,494 0,000 1,513 
2017 0,651 0,651 1,595 0,000 -0,944 -0,494 0,000 1,910 
2016 0,351 0,351 1,595 0,000 -1,244 -0,494 0,000 2,517 
2015 0,002 0,002 1,595 0,000 -1,593 -0,494 0,000 3,224 
2014 -0,279 -0,279 1,595 0,000 -1,874 -0,494 0,000 3,792 
2013 -0,700 -0,700 1,595 0,000 -2,295 -0,494 0,000 4,645 
2012 -1,374 -1,374 1,595 0,000 -2,969 -0,494 0,000 6,010 
2011 -0,295 -0,295 2,619 0,000 -2,913 -0,493 0,000 5,912 
2010 2,368 2,368 0,887 0,000 1,481 -0,486 0,000 -3,047 
2009 -0,843 -0,843 0,236 0,000 -1,080 -0,474 0,000 2,278 
2008 -1,161 -1,161 1,332 0,000 -2,493 -0,492 0,000 5,063 
2007 1,336 1,336 1,498 0,000 -0,162 -0,490 0,000 0,331 
2006 1,389 1,389 1,491 0,000 -0,102 -0,488 0,000 0,209 
2005 1,727 1,727 1,316 0,000 0,410 -0,484 0,000 -0,847 
2004 3,439 3,000 1,353 0,439 2,086 -0,479 -0,917 -4,355 
2003 3,312 3,000 0,921 0,312 2,391 -0,475 -0,658 -5,037 
2002 4,957 3,000   1,957   -0,480 -4,073   
2001 3,710 3,000   0,710   -0,483 -1,471   
2000 4,368 3,000   1,368   -0,483 -2,830   
1999 8,001 3,000   5,001   -0,465 -10,762   
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Finland 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 -1,355 -1,355 0,757 0,000 -2,112 -0,336 0,000 6,282 
2017 -1,429 -1,429 0,757 0,000 -2,186 -0,336 0,000 6,502 
2016 -1,527 -1,527 0,757 0,000 -2,284 -0,336 0,000 6,794 
2015 -1,672 -1,672 0,757 0,000 -2,429 -0,336 0,000 7,225 
2014 -1,830 -1,830 0,757 0,000 -2,587 -0,336 0,000 7,695 
2013 -1,631 -1,631 0,757 0,000 -2,388 -0,336 0,000 7,103 
2012 -1,976 -1,976 0,757 0,000 -2,734 -0,336 0,000 8,130 
2011 -1,273 -1,273 1,162 0,000 -2,435 -0,339 0,000 7,190 
2010 1,136 1,136 -0,019 0,000 1,155 -0,335 0,000 -3,448 
2009 0,994 0,994 0,042 0,000 0,952 -0,316 0,000 -3,009 
2008 3,800 3,000 -1,445 0,800 5,245 -0,372 -2,153 -14,109 
2007 5,294 3,000 -0,832 2,294 6,127 -0,366 -6,265 -16,729 
2006 4,386 3,000 -0,702 1,386 5,088 -0,365 -3,802 -13,959 
2005 3,189 3,000 -0,396 0,189 3,585 -0,343 -0,551 -10,441 
2004 6,111 3,000 -0,946 3,111 7,057 -0,332 -9,372 -21,260 
2003 4,622 3,000 -1,200 1,622 5,823 -0,325 -4,995 -17,927 
2002 8,548 3,000   5,548   -0,336 -16,512   
2001 8,601 3,000   5,601   -0,342 -16,385   
2000 7,978 3,000   4,978   -0,354 -14,070   
1999 5,434 3,000   2,434   -0,326 -7,476   
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France 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 -0,011 -0,011 -0,569 0,000 0,558 -0,248 0,000 -2,253 
2017 -0,303 -0,303 -0,569 0,000 0,266 -0,248 0,000 -1,074 
2016 -0,632 -0,632 -0,569 0,000 -0,063 -0,248 0,000 0,255 
2015 -1,077 -1,077 -0,569 0,000 -0,508 -0,248 0,000 2,053 
2014 -1,578 -1,578 -0,569 0,000 -1,009 -0,248 0,000 4,077 
2013 -1,585 -1,585 -0,569 0,000 -1,016 -0,248 0,000 4,105 
2012 -2,543 -2,543 -0,569 0,000 -1,974 -0,248 0,000 7,974 
2011 -1,974 -1,974 -0,507 0,000 -1,467 -0,244 0,000 6,024 
2010 -1,642 -1,642 -0,074 0,000 -1,569 -0,233 0,000 6,728 
2009 -1,422 -1,422 0,067 0,000 -1,488 -0,216 0,000 6,884 
2008 -1,883 -1,883 -0,045 0,000 -1,838 -0,244 0,000 7,537 
2007 -0,996 -0,996 0,049 0,000 -1,045 -0,243 0,000 4,296 
2006 -0,408 -0,408 0,041 0,000 -0,450 -0,244 0,000 1,839 
2005 -0,321 -0,321 -0,191 0,000 -0,131 -0,239 0,000 0,545 
2004 0,784 0,784 -0,164 0,000 0,949 -0,238 0,000 -3,989 
2003 0,995 0,995 0,093 0,000 0,902 -0,236 0,000 -3,821 
2002 1,710 1,710   0,000   -0,248 0,000   
2001 2,294 2,294   0,000   -0,254 0,000   
2000 1,763 1,763   0,000   -0,258 0,000   
1999 3,334 3,000   0,334   -0,239 -1,397   
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Germany 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 4,607 3,000 1,388 1,607 3,219 -0,397 -4,051 -8,114 
2017 4,833 3,000 1,388 1,833 3,445 -0,397 -4,620 -8,684 
2016 5,076 3,000 1,388 2,076 3,688 -0,397 -5,233 -9,296 
2015 5,397 3,000 1,388 2,397 4,009 -0,397 -6,042 -10,106 
2014 5,721 3,000 1,388 2,721 4,333 -0,397 -6,859 -10,922 
2013 5,972 3,000 1,388 2,972 4,584 -0,397 -7,491 -11,555 
2012 7,545 3,000 1,388 4,545 6,157 -0,397 -11,456 -15,520 
2011 6,531 3,000 1,916 3,531 4,615 -0,391 -9,028 -11,799 
2010 5,847 3,000 0,248 2,847 5,599 -0,376 -7,573 -14,891 
2009 5,239 3,000 -0,307 2,239 5,546 -0,347 -6,445 -15,964 
2008 5,854 3,000 1,067 2,854 4,787 -0,379 -7,538 -12,643 
2007 6,726 3,000 1,550 3,726 5,176 -0,373 -9,977 -13,859 
2006 5,408 3,000 0,830 2,408 4,578 -0,365 -6,605 -12,557 
2005 3,897 3,000 0,309 0,897 3,588 -0,341 -2,631 -10,531 
2004 3,898 3,000 0,117 0,898 3,781 -0,324 -2,773 -11,675 
2003 1,591 1,591 0,047 0,000 1,544 -0,306 0,000 -5,050 
2002 2,142 2,142   0,000   -0,305 0,000   
2001 0,267 0,267   0,000   -0,300 0,000   
2000 -1,914 -1,914   0,000   -0,290 0,000   
1999 -1,594 -1,594   0,000   -0,262 0,000   
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Greece 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 1,077 1,077 4,920 0,000 -3,843 -0,244 0,000 15,730 
2017 0,743 0,743 4,920 0,000 -4,177 -0,244 0,000 17,097 
2016 0,263 0,263 4,920 0,000 -4,657 -0,244 0,000 19,062 
2015 0,096 0,096 4,920 0,000 -4,824 -0,244 0,000 19,746 
2014 -0,459 -0,459 4,920 0,000 -5,379 -0,244 0,000 22,018 
2013 -0,986 -0,986 4,920 0,000 -5,906 -0,244 0,000 24,175 
2012 -7,078 -3,000 4,920 -4,078 -11,998 -0,244 16,695 49,115 
2011 -12,301 -3,000 2,347 -9,301 -14,648 -0,229 40,542 63,846 
2010 -10,420 -3,000 0,125 -7,420 -10,546 -0,207 35,816 50,901 
2009 -9,777 -3,000 -0,553 -6,777 -9,224 -0,183 37,107 50,505 
2008 -12,895 -3,000 -4,321 -9,895 -8,573 -0,222 44,529 38,582 
2007 -12,365 -3,000 -6,370 -9,365 -5,995 -0,220 42,663 27,310 
2006 -9,812 -3,000 -5,216 -6,812 -4,596 -0,214 31,765 21,432 
2005 -7,108 -3,000 -4,158 -4,108 -2,950 -0,215 19,114 13,726 
2004 -5,045 -3,000 -4,485 -2,045 -0,560 -0,213 9,619 2,633 
2003 -6,041 -3,000 -3,909 -3,041 -2,132 -0,193 15,748 11,039 
2002 -6,812 -3,000   -3,812   -0,202 18,869   
2001 -7,610 -3,000   -4,610   -0,226 20,379   
2000 -8,656 -3,000   -5,656   -0,235 24,048   
1999 -6,232 -3,000   -3,232   -0,216 14,951   
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Ireland 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 3,458 3,000 -2,963 0,458 6,421 -0,488 -0,939 -13,169 
2017 3,475 3,000 -2,963 0,475 6,438 -0,488 -0,974 -13,204 
2016 3,324 3,000 -2,963 0,324 6,287 -0,488 -0,664 -12,894 
2015 3,140 3,000 -2,963 0,140 6,103 -0,488 -0,287 -12,517 
2014 3,050 3,000 -2,963 0,050 6,013 -0,488 -0,103 -12,332 
2013 2,316 2,316 -2,963 0,000 5,279 -0,488 0,000 -10,827 
2012 -1,006 -1,006 -2,963 0,000 1,957 -0,488 0,000 -4,014 
2011 -3,958 -3,000 -1,003 -0,958 -2,955 -0,494 1,939 5,983 
2010 -4,357 -3,000 4,987 -1,357 -9,344 -0,496 2,736 18,835 
2009 -4,186 -3,000 3,913 -1,186 -8,099 -0,497 2,387 16,299 
2008 -5,116 -3,000 -0,687 -2,116 -4,429 -0,491 4,310 9,019 
2007 -1,351 -1,351 -0,407 0,000 -0,944 -0,487 0,000 1,938 
2006 0,863 0,863 -1,863 0,000 2,727 -0,485 0,000 -5,620 
2005 1,119 1,119 -1,215 0,000 2,334 -0,488 0,000 -4,778 
2004 3,666 3,000 -1,248 0,666 4,914 -0,491 -1,356 -10,004 
2003 5,514 3,000 -1,381 2,514 6,894 -0,491 -5,118 -14,039 
2002 6,471 3,000   3,471   -0,498 -6,973   
2001 7,147 3,000   4,147   -0,496 -8,357   
2000 7,498 3,000   4,498   -0,497 -9,045   
1999 5,436 3,000   2,436   -0,496 -4,908   
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Italy 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 -1,081 -1,081 -0,457 0,000 -0,624 -0,268 0,000 2,326 
2017 -0,740 -0,740 -0,457 0,000 -0,283 -0,268 0,000 1,054 
2016 -0,427 -0,427 -0,457 0,000 0,030 -0,268 0,000 -0,113 
2015 -0,035 -0,035 -0,457 0,000 0,422 -0,268 0,000 -1,576 
2014 0,206 0,206 -0,457 0,000 0,663 -0,268 0,000 -2,474 
2013 -0,011 -0,011 -0,457 0,000 0,446 -0,268 0,000 -1,665 
2012 -1,704 -1,704 -0,457 0,000 -1,246 -0,268 0,000 4,648 
2011 -3,633 -3,000 -0,908 -0,633 -2,725 -0,258 2,452 10,559 
2010 -4,099 -3,000 0,072 -1,099 -4,171 -0,241 4,556 17,298 
2009 -2,469 -2,469 0,386 0,000 -2,855 -0,219 0,000 13,023 
2008 -3,013 -3,000 -0,682 -0,013 -2,331 -0,255 0,051 9,136 
2007 -1,315 -1,315 -0,933 0,000 -0,382 -0,258 0,000 1,479 
2006 -1,365 -1,365 -0,594 0,000 -0,771 -0,249 0,000 3,099 
2005 -0,808 -0,808 -0,546 0,000 -0,262 -0,236 0,000 1,113 
2004 -0,126 -0,126 -0,433 0,000 0,308 -0,230 0,000 -1,335 
2003 -0,452 -0,452 -0,350 0,000 -0,102 -0,224 0,000 0,456 
2002 0,201 0,201   0,000   -0,233 0,000   
2001 0,995 0,995   0,000   -0,243 0,000   
2000 0,130 0,130   0,000   -0,243 0,000   
1999 1,030 1,030   0,000   -0,223 0,000   
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Netherlands 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 10,849 3,000 0,915 7,849 9,934 -0,496 -15,836 -20,043 
2017 11,143 3,000 0,915 8,143 10,228 -0,496 -16,429 -20,636 
2016 11,382 3,000 0,915 8,382 10,467 -0,496 -16,912 -21,119 
2015 11,367 3,000 0,915 8,367 10,452 -0,496 -16,881 -21,088 
2014 11,029 3,000 0,915 8,029 10,114 -0,496 -16,199 -20,406 
2013 10,867 3,000 0,915 7,867 9,952 -0,496 -15,873 -20,079 
2012 9,320 3,000 0,915 6,320 8,405 -0,496 -12,752 -16,959 
2011 10,371 3,000 0,802 7,371 9,569 -0,492 -14,989 -19,459 
2010 8,102 3,000 0,030 5,102 8,072 -0,484 -10,537 -16,671 
2009 6,075 3,000 0,011 3,075 6,064 -0,461 -6,673 -13,159 
2008 5,199 3,000 -0,259 2,199 5,458 -0,480 -4,585 -11,379 
2007 6,506 3,000 0,161 3,506 6,345 -0,475 -7,378 -13,352 
2006 8,585 3,000 -0,114 5,585 8,698 -0,472 -11,830 -18,426 
2005 6,355 3,000 0,133 3,355 6,221 -0,464 -7,234 -13,415 
2004 6,737 3,000 -0,044 3,737 6,781 -0,454 -8,226 -14,928 
2003 5,061 3,000 -0,617 2,061 5,678 -0,443 -4,652 -12,816 
2002 3,022 3,000   0,022   -0,447 -0,048   
2001 3,890 3,000   0,890   -0,457 -1,948   
2000 2,965 2,965   0,000   -0,465 0,000   
1999 4,833 3,000   1,833   -0,443 -4,136   
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Portugal 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 2,309 2,309 -0,560 0,000 2,869 -0,325 0,000 -8,838 
2017 1,776 1,776 -0,560 0,000 2,336 -0,325 0,000 -7,196 
2016 1,366 1,366 -0,560 0,000 1,926 -0,325 0,000 -5,933 
2015 0,925 0,925 -0,560 0,000 1,485 -0,325 0,000 -4,575 
2014 0,863 0,863 -0,560 0,000 1,423 -0,325 0,000 -4,384 
2013 0,907 0,907 -0,560 0,000 1,467 -0,325 0,000 -4,519 
2012 -3,704 -3,000 -0,560 -0,704 -3,144 -0,325 2,170 9,685 
2011 -8,314 -3,000 -3,398 -5,314 -4,916 -0,306 17,383 16,080 
2010 -11,094 -3,000 -0,728 -8,094 -10,366 -0,276 29,360 37,602 
2009 -11,460 -3,000 1,078 -8,460 -12,539 -0,252 33,575 49,760 
2008 -13,303 -3,000 -2,500 -10,303 -10,803 -0,284 36,319 38,081 
2007 -10,767 -3,000 -3,396 -7,767 -7,371 -0,282 27,555 26,149 
2006 -11,441 -3,000 -2,331 -8,441 -9,109 -0,273 30,933 33,384 
2005 -10,780 -3,000 -2,297 -7,780 -8,484 -0,249 31,217 34,038 
2004 -8,422 -3,000 -1,552 -5,422 -6,870 -0,252 21,505 27,248 
2003 -6,291 -3,000 -1,630 -3,291 -4,661 -0,249 13,217 18,721 
2002 -7,145 -3,000   -4,145   -0,249 16,659   
2001 -8,804 -3,000   -5,804   -0,252 23,001   
2000 -8,852 -3,000   -5,852   -0,259 22,626   
1999 -7,338 -3,000   -4,338   -0,245 17,710   
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Spain 
Year UCA 
Target Output gap 
CAIP 
FEER adjusted REER 
R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) R (3%) R (NFA) 
2018 5,956 3,000 -1,688 2,956 7,644 -0,285 -10,368 -26,810 
2017 5,235 3,000 -1,688 2,235 6,923 -0,285 -7,839 -24,282 
2016 4,440 3,000 -1,688 1,440 6,128 -0,285 -5,051 -21,493 
2015 3,776 3,000 -1,688 0,776 5,464 -0,285 -2,722 -19,164 
2014 2,649 2,649 -1,688 0,000 4,337 -0,285 0,000 -15,211 
2013 1,434 1,434 -1,688 0,000 3,122 -0,285 0,000 -10,950 
2012 -2,403 -2,403 -1,688 0,000 -0,715 -0,285 0,000 2,508 
2011 -4,655 -3,000 -2,236 -1,655 -2,418 -0,272 6,074 8,877 
2010 -5,047 -3,000 0,110 -2,047 -5,158 -0,247 8,288 20,881 
2009 -4,750 -3,000 0,214 -1,750 -4,964 -0,221 7,928 22,490 
2008 -9,233 -3,000 -3,778 -6,233 -5,456 -0,240 25,920 22,686 
2007 -9,551 -3,000 -4,458 -6,551 -5,093 -0,244 26,896 20,911 
2006 -8,481 -3,000 -3,648 -5,481 -4,833 -0,239 22,941 20,227 
2005 -6,920 -3,000 -3,356 -3,920 -3,564 -0,234 16,741 15,219 
2004 -4,730 -3,000 -2,625 -1,730 -2,105 -0,236 7,324 8,910 
2003 -2,701 -2,701 -2,444 0,000 -0,257 -0,239 0,000 1,074 
2002 -2,284 -2,284   0,000   -0,247 0,000   
2001 -2,940 -2,940   0,000   -0,256 0,000   
2000 -3,346 -3,000   -0,346   -0,260 1,335   
1999 -2,517 -2,517   0,000   -0,242 0,000   
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7.3 Appendix C - FEER consistent RBER 
The first two columns show the HICP indexed for 2003, Column three and four are the results 
from the SMIM calculations. The last three equations on the right side are the three different 
RBER used for comparison. R* is calculated using the HICP with Germany as the 
denominato. The two FEER consistent RBER are calculated based on the R* and the 
corresponding SMIM value  
 
  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Austria Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 91,64 93,01       0,985     
1998 92,10 93,20       0,988 
 
  
1999 93,66 94,41 0,0304     0,992 0,963   
2000 95,35 96,49 0,0012     0,988 0,987   
2001 97,07 97,84 0,0057     0,992 0,987   
2002 98,72 99,01 -0,0034     0,997 1,000   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,0088 0,0211   1,000 0,991 0,979 
2004 102,50 102,30 0,0545 0,0971   1,002 0,950 0,913 
2005 104,14 104,45 0,0415 0,0260   0,997 0,957 0,972 
2006 105,81 105,91 0,1065 0,0112   0,999 0,903 0,988 
2007 109,51 109,19 0,1240 -0,0319   1,003 0,892 1,036 
2008 111,15 110,39 0,0433 -0,1608   1,007 0,965 1,200 
2009 112,37 111,28 0,0794 -0,0279   1,010 0,936 1,039 
2010 114,85 113,39 0,1009 -0,0158   1,013 0,920 1,029 
2011 118,75 116,00 0,1419 0,0538   1,024 0,897 0,971 
2012 122,20 118,32 0,1897 0,1316   1,033 0,868 0,913 
2013 122,20 118,32 0,1493 0,1001   1,033 0,899 0,939 
2014 122,20 118,32 0,1415 0,1199   1,033 0,905 0,922 
2015 122,20 118,32 0,1415 0,1199   1,033 0,905 0,922 
2016 122,20 118,32 0,1191 0,1199   1,033 0,923 0,922 
2017 122,20 118,32 0,1081 0,1250   1,033 0,932 0,918 
2018 122,20 118,32 0,1081 0,1250   1,033 0,932 0,918 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Belgium Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 89,86 93,01       0,966     
1998 90,49 93,20       0,971 
 
  
1999 92,39 94,41 -0,0937     0,979 1,080   
2000 95,16 96,49 -0,0269     0,986 1,014   
2001 97,07 97,84 -0,0125     0,992 1,005   
2002 98,33 99,01 -0,0361     0,993 1,030   
2003 100,00 100,00 -0,0066 0,0363   1,000 1,007 0,965 
2004 101,90 102,30 0,0267 0,1149   0,996 0,970 0,893 
2005 104,75 104,45 0,0280 0,1083   1,003 0,976 0,905 
2006 106,95 105,91 0,0765 0,1371   1,010 0,938 0,888 
2007 110,27 109,19 0,1150 0,1517   1,010 0,906 0,877 
2008 113,25 110,39 0,0822 0,1600   1,026 0,948 0,884 
2009 113,59 111,28 0,0670 0,1587   1,021 0,957 0,881 
2010 117,45 113,39 0,0794 0,1004   1,036 0,960 0,941 
2011 121,21 116,00 0,1047 0,1632   1,045 0,946 0,898 
2012 123,75 118,32 0,1453 0,2318   1,046 0,913 0,849 
2013 123,75 118,32 0,1012 0,2121   1,046 0,950 0,863 
2014 123,75 118,32 0,0936 0,2015   1,046 0,956 0,870 
2015 123,75 118,32 0,0936 0,2015   1,046 0,956 0,870 
2016 123,75 118,32 0,0726 0,2015   1,046 0,975 0,870 
2017 123,75 118,32 0,0641 0,1678   1,046 0,983 0,896 
2018 123,75 118,32 0,0641 0,1678   1,046 0,983 0,896 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Finland Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 89,60 93,01       0,963     
1998 90,31 93,20       0,969 
 
  
1999 92,30 94,41 -0,0157     0,978 0,993   
2000 94,98 96,49 -0,1370     0,984 1,141   
2001 97,16 97,84 -0,1519     0,993 1,171   
2002 98,81 99,01 -0,1465     0,998 1,169   
2003 100,00 100,00 -0,0328 0,0748   1,000 1,034 0,930 
2004 100,10 102,30 0,0029 0,1676   0,978 0,976 0,838 
2005 101,20 104,45 0,0632 0,1257   0,969 0,911 0,861 
2006 102,42 105,91 0,1347 0,1224   0,967 0,852 0,862 
2007 104,36 109,19 0,1601 0,0840   0,956 0,824 0,882 
2008 107,91 110,39 0,1241 -0,0151   0,977 0,870 0,992 
2009 109,85 111,28 0,1268 0,1165   0,987 0,876 0,884 
2010 112,93 113,39 0,1613 0,1264   0,996 0,858 0,884 
2011 115,86 116,00 0,2414 0,2419   0,999 0,805 0,804 
2012 119,92 118,32 0,3320 0,4114   1,014 0,761 0,718 
2013 119,92 118,32 0,2684 0,4939   1,014 0,799 0,678 
2014 119,92 118,32 0,2555 0,5101   1,014 0,807 0,671 
2015 119,92 118,32 0,2555 0,5101   1,014 0,807 0,671 
2016 119,92 118,32 0,2167 0,5101   1,014 0,833 0,671 
2017 119,92 118,32 0,1970 0,5111   1,014 0,847 0,671 
2018 119,92 118,32 0,1970 0,5111   1,014 0,847 0,671 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  France Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 91,11 93,01       0,980     
1998 91,38 93,20       0,981 
 
  
1999 92,66 94,41 -0,0074     0,981 0,989   
2000 94,23 96,49 0,0007     0,977 0,976   
2001 95,55 97,84 0,0033     0,977 0,973   
2002 97,66 99,01 0,0027     0,986 0,984   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,0036 0,0405   1,000 0,996 0,961 
2004 102,30 102,30 0,0355 0,1101   1,000 0,966 0,901 
2005 104,14 104,45 0,0301 0,1285   0,997 0,968 0,884 
2006 105,91 105,91 0,0753 0,1661   1,000 0,930 0,858 
2007 108,88 109,19 0,1072 0,1975   0,997 0,901 0,833 
2008 110,18 110,39 0,0790 0,2055   0,998 0,925 0,828 
2009 111,29 111,28 0,0676 0,2244   1,000 0,937 0,817 
2010 113,51 113,39 0,0821 0,2154   1,001 0,925 0,824 
2011 116,58 116,00 0,1039 0,1815   1,005 0,910 0,851 
2012 118,32 118,32 0,1338 0,2461   1,000 0,882 0,803 
2013 118,32 118,32 0,0957 0,1873   1,000 0,913 0,842 
2014 118,32 118,32 0,0892 0,1814   1,000 0,918 0,846 
2015 118,32 118,32 0,0892 0,1814   1,000 0,918 0,846 
2016 118,32 118,32 0,0722 0,1814   1,000 0,933 0,846 
2017 118,32 118,32 0,0650 0,1144   1,000 0,939 0,897 
2018 118,32 118,32 0,0650 0,1144   1,000 0,939 0,897 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Greece Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 82,31 93,01 0,00 %     0,885     
1998 85,35 93,20 0,00 %     0,916 
 
  
1999 87,31 94,41 0,2169     0,925 0,760   
2000 90,54 96,49 0,2425     0,938 0,755   
2001 93,71 97,84 0,2158     0,958 0,788   
2002 96,99 99,01 0,2088     0,980 0,810   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,1763 0,3918   1,000 0,850 0,718 
2004 103,10 102,30 0,1998 0,4332   1,008 0,840 0,703 
2005 106,71 104,45 0,2682 0,3964   1,022 0,806 0,732 
2006 110,12 105,91 0,5154 0,5153   1,040 0,686 0,686 
2007 114,42 109,19 0,6707 0,5499   1,048 0,627 0,676 
2008 116,94 110,39 0,6028 0,5218   1,059 0,661 0,696 
2009 119,98 111,28 0,5052 0,6631   1,078 0,716 0,648 
2010 126,21 113,39 0,5431 0,6912   1,113 0,721 0,658 
2011 128,99 116,00 0,7010 0,8406   1,112 0,654 0,604 
2012 129,38 118,32 0,5954 0,9071   1,093 0,685 0,573 
2013 129,38 118,32 0,3538 0,7958   1,093 0,808 0,609 
2014 129,38 118,32 0,3380 0,7903   1,093 0,817 0,611 
2015 129,38 118,32 0,3380 0,7903   1,093 0,817 0,611 
2016 129,38 118,32 0,2895 0,7903   1,093 0,848 0,611 
2017 129,38 118,32 0,2640 0,7661   1,093 0,865 0,619 
2018 129,38 118,32 0,2640 0,7661   1,093 0,865 0,619 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Ireland Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 80,12 93,01       0,861     
1998 81,88 93,20       0,879 
 
  
1999 85,08 94,41 -0,0169     0,901 0,917   
2000 88,99 96,49 -0,0893     0,922 1,013   
2001 92,82 97,84 -0,0784     0,949 1,029   
2002 97,09 99,01 -0,0631     0,981 1,047   
2003 100,00 100,00 -0,0430 0,0087   1,000 1,045 0,991 
2004 102,40 102,30 0,0477 0,1446   1,001 0,955 0,874 
2005 104,35 104,45 0,0479 0,1223   0,999 0,953 0,890 
2006 107,48 105,91 0,1245 0,1473   1,015 0,902 0,885 
2007 110,92 109,19 0,1658 0,2221   1,016 0,871 0,831 
2008 112,36 110,39 0,1601 0,2218   1,018 0,877 0,833 
2009 109,44 111,28 0,1176 0,3193   0,983 0,880 0,745 
2010 109,22 113,39 0,1463 0,3461   0,963 0,840 0,716 
2011 110,75 116,00 0,1910 0,2106   0,955 0,802 0,789 
2012 112,63 118,32 0,2249 0,2061   0,952 0,777 0,789 
2013 112,63 118,32 0,1748 0,1669   0,952 0,810 0,816 
2014 112,63 118,32 0,1643 0,1535   0,952 0,818 0,825 
2015 112,63 118,32 0,1643 0,1535   0,952 0,818 0,825 
2016 112,63 118,32 0,1317 0,1535   0,952 0,841 0,825 
2017 112,63 118,32 0,1157 0,1399   0,952 0,853 0,835 
2018 112,63 118,32 0,1157 0,1399   0,952 0,853 0,835 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Italy Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 86,99 93,01       0,935     
1998 88,47 93,20       0,949 
 
  
1999 90,33 94,41 0,0121     0,957 0,945   
2000 92,77 96,49 0,0026     0,962 0,959   
2001 94,81 97,84 0,0042     0,969 0,965   
2002 97,56 99,01 0,0049     0,985 0,981   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,0052 0,0867   1,000 0,995 0,920 
2004 102,40 102,30 0,0388 0,1408   1,001 0,964 0,877 
2005 104,55 104,45 0,0335 0,1360   1,001 0,969 0,881 
2006 106,75 105,91 0,0825 0,1801   1,008 0,931 0,854 
2007 109,73 109,19 0,1149 0,1724   1,005 0,901 0,857 
2008 112,37 110,39 0,0855 0,2176   1,018 0,938 0,836 
2009 113,60 111,28 0,0738 0,2836   1,021 0,951 0,795 
2010 115,99 113,39 0,1318 0,3206   1,023 0,904 0,775 
2011 120,28 116,00 0,1370 0,2303   1,037 0,912 0,843 
2012 123,41 118,32 0,1459 0,2262   1,043 0,910 0,851 
2013 123,41 118,32 0,1060 0,1480   1,043 0,943 0,909 
2014 123,41 118,32 0,0993 0,1362   1,043 0,949 0,918 
2015 123,41 118,32 0,0993 0,1362   1,043 0,949 0,918 
2016 123,41 118,32 0,0812 0,1362   1,043 0,965 0,918 
2017 123,41 118,32 0,0733 0,1529   1,043 0,972 0,905 
2018 123,41 118,32 0,0733 0,1529   1,043 0,972 0,905 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Netherlands Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 85,26 93,01       0,917     
1998 86,54 93,20       0,929 
 
  
1999 88,19 94,41 -0,0355     0,934 0,968   
2000 90,75 96,49 -0,0016     0,941 0,942   
2001 95,37 97,84 -0,0177     0,975 0,992   
2002 98,43 99,01 0,0001     0,994 0,994   
2003 100,00 100,00 -0,0419 -0,0444   1,000 1,044 1,046 
2004 101,20 102,30 -0,0431 0,0031   0,989 1,034 0,986 
2005 103,22 104,45 -0,0385 -0,0134   0,988 1,028 1,002 
2006 104,98 105,91 -0,0363 -0,0401   0,991 1,029 1,033 
2007 106,66 109,19 0,0377 0,0154   0,977 0,941 0,962 
2008 108,47 110,39 0,0343 0,0064   0,983 0,950 0,976 
2009 109,23 111,28 0,0018 0,0126   0,982 0,980 0,969 
2010 111,20 113,39 -0,0221 -0,0287   0,981 1,003 1,010 
2011 113,98 116,00 -0,0410 -0,0706   0,983 1,025 1,057 
2012 117,85 118,32 0,0107 0,0046   0,996 0,986 0,991 
2013 117,85 118,32 -0,0561 -0,0371   0,996 1,055 1,034 
2014 117,85 118,32 -0,0656 -0,0438   0,996 1,066 1,042 
2015 117,85 118,32 -0,0656 -0,0438   0,996 1,066 1,042 
2016 117,85 118,32 -0,0896 -0,0438   0,996 1,094 1,042 
2017 117,85 118,32 -0,0924 -0,0615   0,996 1,097 1,061 
2018 117,85 118,32 0,0219 -0,0615   0,996 0,975 1,061 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Portugal Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 83,36 93,01       0,896     
1998 85,70 93,20       0,920 
 
  
1999 87,15 94,41 0,2419     0,923 0,743   
2000 90,46 96,49 0,2290     0,938 0,763   
2001 93,99 97,84 0,2445     0,961 0,772   
2002 97,75 99,01 0,1885     0,987 0,831   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,1533 0,4861   1,000 0,867 0,673 
2004 102,60 102,30 0,3255 0,7302   1,003 0,757 0,580 
2005 105,17 104,45 0,3886 0,6506   1,007 0,725 0,610 
2006 107,79 105,91 0,5107 0,6937   1,018 0,674 0,601 
2007 110,70 109,19 0,5320 0,6046   1,014 0,662 0,632 
2008 111,59 110,39 0,5253 0,5658   1,011 0,663 0,646 
2009 111,48 111,28 0,4773 0,7036   1,002 0,678 0,588 
2010 114,15 113,39 0,4758 0,5989   1,007 0,682 0,630 
2011 118,15 116,00 0,4590 0,3774   1,019 0,698 0,739 
2012 120,63 118,32 0,4229 0,4976   1,020 0,716 0,681 
2013 120,63 118,32 0,3296 0,4546   1,020 0,767 0,701 
2014 120,63 118,32 0,3146 0,4624   1,020 0,776 0,697 
2015 120,63 118,32 0,3146 0,4624   1,020 0,776 0,697 
2016 120,63 118,32 0,2716 0,4624   1,020 0,802 0,697 
2017 120,63 118,32 0,2492 0,4361   1,020 0,816 0,710 
2018 120,63 118,32 0,2492 0,4361   1,020 0,816 0,710 
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  HICP (Indexed 2003) SMIM   RBER values 
  Spain Germany R(3%) R(nfa)   R* R(3%) R(NFA) 
1997 84,26 93,01       0,906     
1998 85,44 93,20       0,917 
 
  
1999 87,83 94,41 0,0239     0,930 0,909   
2000 91,34 96,49 0,0061     0,947 0,941   
2001 93,63 97,84 0,0130     0,957 0,945   
2002 97,37 99,01 0,0127     0,983 0,971   
2003 100,00 100,00 0,0112 0,1243   1,000 0,989 0,889 
2004 103,30 102,30 0,0379 0,2817   1,010 0,973 0,788 
2005 107,12 104,45 0,0121 0,3039   1,026 1,013 0,787 
2006 110,01 105,91 0,0536 0,3798   1,039 0,986 0,753 
2007 114,75 109,19 0,0760 0,3881   1,051 0,977 0,757 
2008 116,47 110,39 0,0477 0,3729   1,055 1,007 0,768 
2009 117,51 111,28 0,0770 0,4039   1,056 0,981 0,752 
2010 120,92 113,39 0,0916 0,3833   1,066 0,977 0,771 
2011 123,82 116,00 0,1232 0,2332   1,067 0,950 0,866 
2012 127,54 118,32 0,1731 0,2347   1,078 0,919 0,873 
2013 127,54 118,32 0,1291 0,0936   1,078 0,955 0,986 
2014 127,54 118,32 0,1214 0,0495   1,078 0,961 1,027 
2015 127,54 118,32 0,1214 0,0495   1,078 0,961 1,027 
2016 127,54 118,32 0,1144 0,0495   1,078 0,967 1,027 
2017 127,54 118,32 0,1126 -0,0546   1,078 0,969 1,140 
2018 127,54 118,32 0,1126 -0,0546   1,078 0,969 1,140 
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7.4 Appendix D Step by step calculation for year 
1999 
The trade weights are calculated according to appendix A. Picking up from equation 4.8 we 
have 
                       
The subscript on the right side of the matrix and vectors indicates the country the country that 
has been removed. 
D.1           
D.2      
 
      
Repeating D.1 and D12 for           gives the following values for    (the matrix has 
been transposed) 
  Aus Bel Fin Fra Gre Ire Ita Lux Neth Por Spa 
Z1 31,501 -11,736 -7,921 -2,332 14,329 -5,730 -0,199 -5,343 16,830 -0,149 -0,422 
Z2 -0,021 5,040 -7,443 -1,005 14,875 -4,913 0,151 -3,666 17,697 0,591 -0,028 
Z3 0,289 -10,947 55,830 -1,606 15,257 -4,793 0,218 -4,478 17,674 0,609 0,451 
Z4 0,085 -10,304 -7,400 5,733 15,071 -4,890 0,547 -4,503 18,095 1,248 0,174 
Z5 0,261 -10,908 -7,021 -1,413 87,735 -4,774 0,867 -4,510 17,658 0,792 0,636 
Z6 0,188 -10,710 -7,086 -1,389 15,211 30,774 0,319 -4,407 17,661 0,751 0,666 
Z7 0,460 -10,905 -7,333 -1,210 15,594 -4,940 9,901 -4,644 17,867 0,943 0,277 
Z8 0,004 -10,033 -7,342 -1,572 14,905 -4,977 0,044 6,160 17,529 0,450 0,042 
Z9 0,037 -10,810 -7,329 -1,114 14,933 -5,049 0,415 -4,611 87,088 3,104 0,167 
Z10 0,190 -10,786 -7,263 -0,829 15,198 -4,827 0,623 -4,559 20,235 17,107 0,356 
Z11 0,395 -10,926 -6,942 -1,425 15,521 -4,434 0,436 -4,488 17,777 0,834 1,269 
 
We calculate the average the 11 different values for the gives. 
Aus Bel Fin Fra Gre Ire Ita Lux Neth Port Spa 
3,035 -9,366 -1,568 -0,742 21,693 -1,687 1,211 -3,550 24,192 2,389 0,326 
 
  
 
